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CHAPTER 1
General Introduction
Chapter 1. General Introduction 2
Ageing is widely seen as one of the most significant risks to global prosperity in the decades
ahead because of its potentially profound economic, social and political implications.
(Klaus Schwaab, World Economic Forum, 2012)
This statement of Klaus Schwaab, the founder and president of the World Economic
Forum, provides an idea about the importance of population aging for today’s society.
Population aging is the change in the age structure, often referred to as demographic
change, which has especially been observed in western countries and which is associated
with great challenges that need to be addressed. The two main drivers of population
aging are the increase in longevity and the decrease in fertility. Both effects combined
result in an increase of a population’s average age (United Nations, 2019). Figure 1.1
shows the aggregate developments of the total fertility rate (TFR) and life expectancy at
birth (LEXP) over all OECD countries since 1960.
Figure 1.1: Average TFR and LEXP over all OECD countries, 1960–2017
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Source: World Bank (2019)
It is apparent that the two described developments have taken place simultaneously.
Fertility (dashed blue line) has decreased from 3.2 in 1960 to 1.7 in 2017, while life
expectancy (dotted red line) has increased from 67 to 80 years over the same time horizon,
resulting in a significant change in the populations’ age structures.
Among others, potential macroeconomic concerns are higher tax rates to maintain the
current pay-as-you-go pension systems, less innovation and, in the long run, a negative
effect on economic growth and economic prosperity (Bloom et al., 2015). While some of
these concerns are undoubtedly justified, there exist channels through which demographic
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change can exert a positive effect on economic growth. Most importantly, for an increas-
ing lifetime horizon, savings increase in order to be able to afford old-age consumption
(Futagami and Nakajima, 2001; Bloom et al., 2003, 2010). Furthermore, longer expected
working lives raise the incentives to invest in education, which promotes economic growth
(Cervellati and Sunde, 2013; Strulik and Werner, 2016). The consequent reduction in fer-
tility (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Boucekkine et al., 2002) can exhibit an additional positive
growth impulse through higher labor force participation (Bloom et al., 2009).
Plenty of research has been conducted on how demography affects economic growth
in the medium run. Just to mention a few contributions, Bloom et al. (2010) as well as
Lee and Mason (2010) investigate the effects of falling support ratios on the production
side of an economy. Heijdra (2009) and I˙mrohorog˘lu and Kitao (2012) analyze how social
security contributions and the pension system are affected by changes in the propensity to
save. In general, the changing savings behavior over the life-cycle is a big issue. Among
others, Bloom et al. (2007), d’Albis (2007) and Krueger and Ludwig (2007) cover this
issue and find mixed results. Many other important contributions about this heavily dis-
cussed debate could be added. All of them consider medium-run effects and are based on
neoclassical models of economic growth such as the Solow (1956) model, the Cass (1965)
and Koopmans (1965) model and the Diamond (1965) model. While these contributions
provide important economic insights, they are missing a crucial point: long-run eco-
nomic growth in industrialized countries is not determined by capital accumulation but
by endogenously driven research and development. The mentioned frameworks might,
therefore, not be able to accurately explain the underlying mechanisms of how demogra-
phy affects long-run economic growth and the well-being of individuals or, at best, miss
important channels.
Economic research has picked up on that issue by relating to the workhorse models
of endogenous growth with horizontal innovations (Romer, 1990) and vertical innovations
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) and semi-endogenous frame-
works with horizontal innovations (Jones, 1995) and vertical innovations (Segerstro¨m,
1998). While these growth models imply a positive relationship between the population
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size, respectively the population growth rate, and economic growth, the empirical litera-
ture finds a negative relationship for most industrialized economies (Brander and Dowrick,
1994; Ahituv, 2001; Li and Zhang, 2007). Therefore, a substantial part of this literature
has focused on integrating longevity effects as in Blanchard (1985), Heijdra and Romp
(2009) and Dalgaard and Strulik (2011) and a quantity-quality tradeoff in the spirit of
Becker and Lewis (1973) and Galor and Weil (2000). To pick out two contributions, Stru-
lik et al. (2013) model educational decisions of parents and their effects on fertility and
human capital accumulation in an endogenous growth framework in the spirit of Romer
(1990) in the very long run by relying on the unified growth theory kicked-off by Galor and
Weil (2000). Prettner (2013) introduces lifetime uncertainty and fertility by combining
an overlapping generations model with a model of endogenous growth. He shows that,
while a decrease in fertility can have a negative effect on long-run economic growth, the
effects of increasing longevity can even be large enough to outweigh this negative effect.
Understanding better the effects of population aging, separating them into different
channels and being able to identify potential policy measures to, at least, counteract the
negative effects of demographic change is one of the most crucial economic and political
challenges ahead. This dissertation contributes to the debate by extending the existing
literature on general equilibrium models of economic growth by including more realistic
demographic structures to enhance the general understanding of how population aging
affects individual behavior and long-run economic growth. More specifically, the main
questions under consideration are:
• How do changes in longevity impact on economic growth through changes in the
saving behavior?
• What are the growth effects of endogenous fertility decisions and how does fertility
interact with increasing longevity?
• What are the underlying effects of demographic change on economic growth in the
very long run?
• What are the welfare implications of longer lifetime horizons?
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This dissertation contains three papers that evolve around the aforementioned research
questions. In Chapter 2, the first paper titled “Longevity-induced vertical innovation and
the tradeoff between life and growth”1 introduces an exogenous survival probability into
a three period overlapping generations framework. Economic growth is driven by quality
improving innovations in the vein of Aghion and Howitt (1992). In the existing literature
on endogenous vertical innovations, infinitely lived representative agents are assumed. The
chosen approach is novel as it introduces a finite lifetime horizon and allows to analyze
the growth effects of changing survival probabilities. The channel through which life
expectancy exerts growth effects is the saving decision of households. A higher probability
to survive until retirement increases aggregate savings which places downward pressure
on the market interest rate. As a consequence, the net present value of holding a patent
increases, which leads to higher R&D employment, a higher probability to innovate and
faster economic progress. The relationship between the survival probability and long-
run economic growth is shown to be strictly concave and decreasing in the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, i.e., in the willingness of individuals to substitute consumption
over time. Additionally, the welfare effects of increasing longevity are analyzed. As a
consequence of a higher life expectancy, productivity growth and, with it, consumption
increase, which positively affects individual utility. At the same time, the direct effect
of living longer also raises individual utility. The two channels are disentangled and it
is shown that the direct utility gain due to higher life expectancy increases with the
development of an economy and is, usually, larger than the indirect effect of longevity-
induced economic growth. This result strongly emphasizes to not only consider the growth
effects of health care.
The discussion surrounding the growth and welfare effects of rising longevity is ex-
tended in Chapter 3 by the second paper titled “Endogenous Life Expectancy and R&D-
based Economic Growth”. Baldanzi et al. (2019) focuses on balanced growth path effects
with an exogenous and constant survival probability and a constant population size. In
Chapter 3, these restrictions are relaxed by introducing endogenous survival similar to
1This paper is joint work with Annarita Baldanzi and Klaus Prettner and has been published in the
Journal of Population Economics as Baldanzi et al. (2019).
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Chakraborty (2004) as well as a quantity-quality tradeoff as in Prettner and Werner (2016)
into a growth framework of horizontal innovations a´ la Romer (1990). Life expectancy
increases in the public resources devoted toward health and still entails a positive rela-
tionship with individual and aggregate savings. Additionally, individuals need to decide
on the number of children to have and on the children’s level of education. Accordingly,
higher life expectancy induces parents to have less children and to work more to be able
to afford higher savings for retirement. It is shown that, on the one hand, higher savings
increase monopoly profits and, thus, employment and productivity in the R&D sector.
On the other hand, the longevity-induced growth effect through the workforce is mostly
negative, as the increase in labor force participation is hardly able to compensate for the
decrease in fertility. In a comparative static exercise, the aggregate growth effects of en-
dogenously increasing life expectancy are analyzed by calibrating the model economy to
U.S. data over the time period 1960–2017. The findings suggest that 11.9% of U.S. out-
put growth over the mentioned timeframe is due to increases in life expectancy. Another
important finding is that the optimal size of the health care sector might lie beyond what
is observed in industrialized countries, nowadays. Also, the size of the health care sector
that would maximize life expectancy is found to be much larger than its growth maxi-
mizing size. These results shed a relatively positive light on the growth effects of rising
longevity and are in line with the finding in Chapter 2 that, from a welfare perspective,
also the direct gains in life expectancy need to be considered.
Chapter 4 takes a closer look at the determinants of economic growth over the very
long run. More specifically, in the paper titled “The Scientific Revolution and Its Role in
the Transition to Sustained Economic Growth”2, basic scientific knowledge is embedded
into a Unified Growth framework similar to Strulik et al. (2013). Thus, knowledge about
the laws of nature, about the scientific method etc. is a necessary input in applied R&D
and increases in the overall number of thinkers in the economy and in their education.
Households face a quantity-quality tradeoff. Fertility decreases and education increases
in income. However, educational investments are zero for low levels of development and
2This paper is joint work with Klaus Prettner.
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only start to increase once income reaches a certain threshold. This is when the economy
experiences the takeoff to sustained economic growth with decreasing fertility, increasing
education, faster productivity growth and faster economic progress. It is shown that the
timing of the takeoff crucially hinges on the rate at which scientific knowledge accumu-
lates as well as on its availability in applied research. For a faster accumulation and a
higher availability of basic scientific knowledge, applied scientists become more produc-
tive, which, eventually, results in a steeper economic takeoff. For low growth rates or
poor availability of basic scientific knowledge, the takeoff occurs up to one generation
later since it takes longer for R&D to become profitable. In the extreme case of zero
basic scientific knowledge, e.g., if scientific achievements are suppressed due to religious
believes, no takeoff might occur at all. The presented framework provides one possible ex-
planation why some regions might have experienced the Industrial Revolution later than
others and what the consequences for today’s economic performances are.
Last, Chapter 5 summarizes the key findings of Chapters 2–4 and draws conclusions
with respect to the research questions posed.
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CHAPTER 2
Longevity-induced Vertical Innovation and the Tradeoff Between
Life and Growth∗
∗This chapter is joint work with Annarita Baldanzi and Klaus Prettner and has been published as
Baldanzi, A., Prettner, K., and Tscheuschner, P. (2019). Longevity-induced vertical innovation and the
tradeoff between life and growth. Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 32(No. 4):1293–1313.
Abstract
We analyze the economic growth effects of rising longevity in a framework of endogenous
growth driven by quality-improving innovations. A rise in longevity increases savings and
thereby places downward pressure on the market interest rate. Since the monopoly profits
generated by a successful innovation are discounted by the endogenous market interest
rate, this raises the net present value of innovations, which, in turn, fosters R&D invest-
ments. The associated increase in the employment of scientists leads to faster technological
progress and a higher long-run economic growth rate. From a welfare perspective, the
direct effect of an increase in life expectancy tends to be larger than the indirect effect
of the induced higher consumption due to faster economic growth. Consequently, the de-
bate on rising health care expenditures should not be predominantly based on the growth
effects of health care.
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2.1 Introduction
At the global level, the total fertility rate has fallen from almost 5 children per woman in
1960 to 2.5 children per woman in 2015. Over the same period, average life expectancy
has increased from 53 years to almost 72 years (World Bank, 2016). Falling fertility and
rising life expectancy are the two main causes of the unprecedented population aging that
industrialized countries started experiencing over the last decades (Bloom et al., 2010).
Of these two forces, declining fertility has contributed more to population aging than
rising life expectancy (Weil, 1997; Bloom and Luca, 2016).
While there are deep-rooted concerns on the negative economic consequences of pop-
ulation aging in the public debate (see, for example, The Economist, 2011a,b), a negative
effect on economic growth is not yet visible in the data (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017).
One of the reasons might be that increasing longevity has positive side effects that tend
to raise economic growth. For example, if individuals expect a longer life, they save more
in order to sustain their living standards in a prolonged retirement period (Futagami and
Nakajima, 2001; Bloom et al., 2003, 2007, 2010). In addition, the longer expected work-
ing life that comes with rising longevity implies stronger incentives to invest in education,
which raises labor productivity and thereby economic growth (Cervellati and Sunde, 2013;
Ang and Madsen, 2015; Strulik and Werner, 2016).
From an empirical perspective, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) and Hansen and Lønstrop
(2015) find a negative effect of increasing life expectancy on economic growth. However,
most of the empirical evidence points to the contrary. For example, Lorentzen et al.
(2008), Aghion et al. (2011), and Bloom et al. (2014) show that higher life expectancy
has been a driver of economic growth in the past. Cervellati and Sunde (2011) argue
that the stage of development of a country is crucial in assessing the effects of increas-
ing life expectancy on economic growth. In less developed countries, which did not yet
experience the demographic transition, increasing life expectancy leads to faster popula-
tion growth. This raises capital dilution and thereby tends to reduce economic growth.
By contrast, in developed countries, which already experienced the demographic transi-
tion in the past, a rise in life expectancy reduces population growth and capital dilution
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and thereby exerts a positive effect on economic growth. Hansen and Lønstrop (2015)
and Gehringer and Prettner (2019) corroborate this finding when focusing exclusively on
developed economies.
We aim at contributing to this debate by proposing a theoretical mechanism by which
increasing longevity affects economic growth in modern knowledge-based economies. In
these economies, growth is driven by endogenous technological progress (Romer, 1990;
Jones, 1995; Strulik et al., 2013) such that the analysis needs to be based on a model
that takes into account the effects of increasing longevity on the incentives to innovate.1
While there has been some progress in the analysis of the effects of increasing longevity
on horizontal innovation, i.e., the introduction of new intermediate product varieties (see,
for example, Prettner, 2013; Hashimoto and Tabata, 2016; Prettner and Trimborn, 2017;
Futagami and Konishi, 2019), we are not aware of a comparable study that is based
on vertical innovations, i.e., the quality-improvements of existing intermediate products.
Closing this gap in the literature is important for two reasons: i) due to the different
mechanism that generates growth in the vertical innovation framework as compared to
the horizontal innovation framework, the pathway by which increasing longevity affects
economic growth might be different; ii) the welfare implications of both frameworks could
differ because there is a Schumpeterian creative destruction effect in the vertical inno-
vation framework, where each new innovation drives the old incumbent out of business.
This implies a potentially negative welfare effect of innovation that is not present in the
framework of horizontal innovation. Thus, the long-run growth rate might be too high
from a social point of view within the vertical innovation framework, a result that cannot
occur within the horizontal innovation setting.
Endogenous and semi-endogenous growth models with vertical innovations (Grossman
and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Segerstro¨m, 1998) are suited to analyze the
economic growth effects of changing population size and changing population growth. The
1For the growth effects of demographic change in economies in which medium- and long-run growth
are driven by physical capital accumulation – either according to the neoclassical growth model (Solow,
1956; Cass, 1965; Diamond, 1965) or according to an AK type of perpetual growth model (Romer, 1986)
– see, for example, Chakraborty (2004), Heijdra and Romp (2006), Heijdra and Ligthart (2006), Heijdra
and Mierau (2011), Sa´nchez-Romero (2013), Mierau and Turnovsky (2014a,b), and Sa´nchez-Romero et al.
(2018).
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basic mechanism in this framework is that research activities randomly lead to quality-
improving innovations. The more researchers an economy employs and the more produc-
tive these researchers are, the higher is the probability that a new innovation occurs in a
given time period. If a quality-improving innovation occurs, it raises the productivity of
intermediate goods in producing the final consumption good. Thus, a higher probability
of innovation raises long-run economic growth. In a recent extension of this model class,
Chu et al. (2013) endogenize fertility and human capital accumulation and analyze the
effects of changing patent policies. They find that strengthening patent protection tends
to have a positive effect on long-run growth although it raises fertility and thereby reduces
human capital accumulation.2
When it comes to the analysis of changing longevity, however, the described models
of vertical innovation cannot be used directly because they rely on the notion of a repre-
sentative agent. By definition, the representative agent lives forever, such that changes in
life expectancy cannot be conceptualized. To be able to analyze the effects of increasing
longevity in this setting, we introduce an overlapping generations structure into the model
proposed by Aghion and Howitt (1992), which has been simplified subsequently by Aghion
and Howitt (1999, 2005, 2009). In so doing, we assume a demographic structure with three
phases in the individual life cycle: childhood, adulthood, and retirement. Individuals face
an exogenously given survival probability from adulthood to retirement. Varying this
parameter allows us to analyze the long-run growth effects of changing longevity and the
mechanisms by which they unfold.
We show that, if longevity increases, the economy saves more at the aggregate level,
which places downward pressure on the market interest rate. Since innovators discount
the future expected profits of an innovation by the market interest rate, the net present
value of an innovation and, thus, the incentive to come up with a quality-improving new
idea rise. To increase the probability of a successful quality-improvement, R&D firms
hire additional researchers, which raises the innovation rate and productivity growth.
2For other contributions that focus on various aspects of the protection of intellectual property, see,
for example, Helpman (1993), Chu (2009), Iwaisako and Futagami (2013), Cozzi and Galli (2014), and
Pan et al. (2018).
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The presence of this channel in our extension is based on an important difference to the
underlying model of Aghion and Howitt (1992). For simplicity, they assume a constant
and exogenous interest rate. Since this assumption switches off the crucial mechanism by
which increasing life expectancy could affect the incentives to innovate and thereby exert
an influence on long-run economic growth, our extension of the model allows for gaining
important additional insights with respect to the growth effects of demographic changes.
We apply our overlapping generations model of vertical innovation to analyze the
welfare effects of increasing life expectancy by decomposing them into two separate effects.
The direct effect is that higher life expectancy allows individuals to enjoy consumption
over a longer expected time period. The indirect effect is the induced increase in the
growth rate of output and consumption as described above. We show that the direct
welfare effect tends to be higher than the indirect welfare effect. This result is consistent
with the literature showing that an increase in investments in the health sector of an
economy beyond the growth-maximizing point – such that additional resources channeled
toward the health sector reduce economic growth – can be Pareto improving (Kuhn and
Prettner, 2016). Furthermore, we show that the relative importance of the direct welfare
effect increases with economic development. This is consistent with Hall and Jones (2007),
who show that, as the economy develops, it is optimal to invest an ever larger share of
aggregate income in better health.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce the overlapping genera-
tions structure that we implement into a standard model of vertical innovation. In Section
2.3, we derive our main analytical results with respect to the growth effects of increasing
life expectancy and present the numerical results with respect to the welfare decompo-
sition into the direct effect and into the indirect effect. In Section 2.4, we summarize,
draw an important lesson from a policy perspective, and discuss interesting questions for
further research.
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2.2 The model
2.2.1 Consumption side
Consider an overlapping generations economy populated by single-sex individuals living
for three time periods: childhood, adulthood, and retirement. Childhood lasts for 20
years, adulthood for 40 years, and the phase of retirement can last for 40 years after which
an individual dies for sure (cf. Ludwig and Vogel, 2010). As a consequence, the maximum
achievable life span is 100 years. However, there is a survival probability from adulthood to
retirement, which determines actual life expectancy. Children face no economic decisions
and fulfill their consumption needs via parental expenditures. Adults consume, save for
retirement, work for the wage rate wt, and give birth to one child such that the cohort
size of adults stays constant over time. We assume that parents give birth to children in
the middle of the adulthood period, implying that children enter adulthood at the time
when adults enter retirement. Finally, retirees consume out of the savings accumulated as
adults (see Samuelson, 1958; Diamond, 1965, for the corresponding consumption-savings
decision).
We conceptualize an adult’s remaining lifetime utility (ut) by a logarithmic utility
function that ensures analytical tractability:
ut = ln(c1,t) + φβ ln(c2,t+1), (2.1)
where c1,t is the consumption level of an adult at time t, c2,t+1 refers to the consumption
level in retirement at time t + 1, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and φ ∈ (0, 1) is the
survival probability between adulthood and retirement.3
Following Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), there are perfect and fair annuity mar-
kets at which individuals insure themselves against the risk of dying with positive assets.
The importance of annuity markets in industrialized countries is mainly due to public
pension systems with mandatory annuitization (cf. Sheshinski, 2008; Heijdra and Mierau,
3For similar treatments of the survival probability in the overlapping generations literature, see, for
example, Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Chakraborty (2004), and Zhang and Zhang (2005).
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2012; Schneider and Winkler, 2016; Kuhn and Prettner, 2018). Hosseini (2015) shows,
for example, that approximately half of retirement wealth in the United States is held
in the form of annuities. At the end of the first period, every individual deposits her
savings with a mutual fund. This fund buys assets in the form of shares of firms yielding
a gross rate of return of (1 + rt+1)/φ, where rt+1 is the real rate of return on savings that
is equivalent to the dividend yield plus the valuation gain of the investment and where
the denominator accounts for the redistribution of assets by the life insurance company
from those who died among those who survived.
As a consequence of this setting, the budget constraints of adults and retirees are given
by
c1,t + st = wt, (2.2)
c2,t+1 =
1 + rt+1
φ
· st, (2.3)
where consumption as adult plus savings for retirement (st) cannot exceed wage income
in the first period of life [Equation (2.2)] and consumption of retirees who survived from
adulthood to retirement is given by the savings carried over from adulthood plus the
return earned by investing in the annuity market [Equation (2.3)]. Combining these two
equations yields the lifetime budget constraint
c1,t + φ
c2,t+1
1 + rt+1
= wt. (2.4)
From the first-order conditions of the associated optimization problem, the individual
Euler equation follows as
c2,t+1
c1,t
= (1 + rt+1) β. (2.5)
Notice that the survival probability drops out of the individual Euler equation because of
the fully insured mortality risk. In the absence of full annuitization, the mechanisms of our
model would even be strengthened because the probability of surviving showed up on the
right hand side of the individual Euler equation with a positive influence on consumption
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growth. Thus, as far as the growth effects of increasing longevity are concerned, we are
conservative in assuming a perfect annuity market.
Since the birth rate is equal to the replacement rate, the relative cohort size between
adults and retirees is only influenced by the survival probability to the extent that N2,t+1 =
φN1,t. Defining consumption of adults and of retirees by C1,t = c1,tN1,t and C2,t+1 =
c2,t+1N2,t+1, respectively, aggregation yields c2,t+1N2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)βc1,tφN1,t. From this
expression, the “cohort” Euler equation follows immediately as
C2,t+1
C1,t
= (1 + rt+1) βφ. (2.6)
To our best knowledge, we are the first to distinguish between the individual and the
cohort Euler equation in discrete time with lifetime uncertainty. It is important to note
that the cohort Euler equation differs from the “aggregate” Euler equation that is well-
known from the literature on lifetime uncertainty in continuous time (cf. Blanchard, 1985;
Buiter, 1988; Heijdra, 2009). The cohort Euler equation only takes into account the growth
of consumption of the adult cohort in period t to the next period t+1, when the members
of the cohort are retired. It does not consider the change in consumption that is due to
different levels of consumption between those who are retired in period t and the adults in
period t+ 1. The aggregate Euler equation would also take this part of the consumption
change into account and it can be shown that, if the economy is on its long-run balanced
growth path, the cohort-specific consumption growth rate and the aggregate consumption
growth rate are equal.
2.2.2 Production side
The production side of the economy is a simplified version of the production side of
the Schumpeterian growth model developed by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and further
elaborated upon in Aghion and Howitt (1999, 2005). There are three sectors, the final
goods sector, the intermediate goods sector, and the R&D sector. The aggregate final
good is produced under perfect competition using the intermediate good as input. The
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intermediate good in turn is produced by a monopoly that converts one unit of labor
into one unit of the intermediate good (i.e, intermediate goods producers utilize a one-to-
one technology). The monopolist owns the patent of the most recent quality-improving
innovation developed in the R&D sector. When the next quality-improving innovation
occurs, the incumbent is driven out of business and loses the monopoly rents. Since
monopolies in the intermediate goods sector earn a positive profit stream as long as they
are the incumbent, the firms have positive value and their shares are sold via the mutual
funds to the households in the economy. We abstract from physical capital such that these
shares represent the only savings vehicle. Introducing physical capital would complicate
the model substantially without changing the main mechanisms.4
The final good is denoted by Yt and produced according to the production function
Yt = Atx
α
t , (2.7)
where At refers to the productivity of the intermediate good in producing the final good,
xt is the intermediate good produced by the monopolist, and α ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity
of output with respect to intermediate inputs. The intermediate good is produced by
using the amount xt of the production factor labor, which is fixed due to our demographic
assumptions and denoted by L. Labor is also used in the research sector, with the amount
being denoted by nt. Consequently, the labor market clearing condition is
L = xt + nt. (2.8)
Given employment nt in the research sector, the arrival of innovations follows a random
Poisson arrival rate λ · nt, where λ > 0 denotes the productivity of researchers. This
means that more researchers and a higher productivity of these researchers both increase
the probability of a successful innovation in a given period. The firm that succeeds to
obtain the newest innovation from the R&D sector monopolizes the intermediate goods
sector until it is replaced by the next innovator.
4For a framework of horizontal innovation with increasing longevity in which both types of assets,
physical capital and shares of intermediate goods producers, are available, see Prettner (2013).
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Innovations are tantamount to the introduction of a new variety of the single inter-
mediate good with a higher quality that replaces the previous one. The new intermediate
good increases the productivity level At by a constant factor γ > 1. Rewriting the index
of productivity such that it refers to the number of innovations that already happened in
the past (as denoted by i) instead of time, we therefore have
Ai+1 = γ · Ai. (2.9)
It is important to keep the distinction between the time period, t, and the number of
innovations, i, because, in an overlapping generations model in which a time period lasts
for 40 years, many innovations will occur within one single period. This is also the reason
why there are no jumps in the growth rate over time along a balanced growth path. As
compared to the continuous time setting of Aghion and Howitt (1992), which assumes a
continuum of intermediate goods producing firms to avoid discontinuities in the growth
rate, the law of large numbers applies over time in our case and ensures a smooth growth
rate. For the robustness of our results in a model variant with a continuum of intermediate
good sectors, see the appendix.
The employment level of researchers can be calculated with the help of the no-arbitrage
condition
wi = λVi+1, (2.10)
where wi refers to the wage of the researchers and Vi+1 to the discounted expected payoff
of innovation i+ 1. The no-arbitrage condition states that the investment of the research
firm in terms of the wage bill for scientists has to be equal to the discounted payoff of
the expected monopoly rents over the period in which the innovator will be the new
incumbent. The value of Vi+1 is in turn determined by the no-arbitrage equation for the
investments of households given by
ri+1Vi+1 = pii+1 − λni+1Vi+1. (2.11)
The left-hand side is the income earned on an investment of the amount Vi+1 at the risk
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free interest rate ri+1, while the right-hand side consists of the monopoly profits due to
owning the incumbent firm minus the expected loss that occurs when the incumbent is
driven out of business by a new quality-improving innovation (the Schumpeterian creative
destruction effect). While the interest rate is exogenously given in Aghion and Howitt
(1999), the aggregate Euler equation that coincides with the cohort Euler equation along
the balanced growth path determines the real interest rate in our overlapping generations
framework. Hence, we endogenize the interest rate, which is particularly important when
analyzing the growth effects of increasing life expectancy.
From Equation (2.11), we obtain
Vi+1 =
pii+1
ri+1 + λni+1
, (2.12)
stating that the value of the firm is equal to the discounted expected profit with the
effective discount rate being the interest rate (ri+1) plus the probability of a new in-
novation that drives the incumbent out of business (λni+1). It is straightforward that
∂Vi+1/∂ni+1 < 0, i.e., if more researchers are employed in the R&D sector, the probabil-
ity of the next innovation is larger, which implies lower expected monopoly profits because
an incumbent tends to be replaced earlier. The incumbent innovator determines optimal
output xi by maximizing
pii = pi(xi)xi − wixi (2.13)
with respect to the choice of xi. This choice in turn determines the profits pii. Given
perfect competition in the final good sector, pi(xi) = Aiαx
α−1
i is the inverse demand
function for intermediates. The maximization of profits then yields
xi =
(
α2Ai
wi
) 1
1−α
. (2.14)
Substituting pi(xi) in Equation (2.13) by the inverse demand function for intermediates,
we obtain
pii =
(
1
α
− 1
)
wixi = Ai
1− α
α
ωixi = Aip˜i, (2.15)
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where ωi = wi/Ai is the productivity-adjusted wage rate and p˜i = (1−α)ωx/α. Exploiting
the new definition of profits in Equation (2.15) and dividing both sides of Equation (2.10)
by Ai, acknowledging that Ai+1/Ai = γ from Equation (2.9), we can rewrite the no-
arbitrage condition as
ωi = λ
γp˜i (ωi+1)
ri+1 + λni+1
. (2.16)
To be consistent, we also rewrite the labor market clearing condition in terms of the
productivity-adjusted wage rate
L = ni +
(
α2
ωi
) 1
1−α
. (2.17)
The production function, Equation (2.7), can be reformulated as Yi = Ai (L− ni)α by
exploiting the labor market clearing condition. This implies that
Yi+1 = γYi, (2.18)
meaning that output grows at the rate γ − 1 with each innovation that occurs. Since
the time between two innovations is random, we compute the average growth rate of the
economy over a generation by relying on the relation
lnYt+1 = lnYt + ln(γ) · t, (2.19)
where t is the number of innovations between time t and time t + 1. The number
of innovations is Poisson distributed with the parameter λ · nt referring to the average
number of innovations over a generation. Computing the expectation of Equation (2.19),
we get the average growth rate of the economy, gt, as
gt = E (lnYt+1 − lnYt) = λ · nt · ln(γ). (2.20)
This is also the growth rate of per capita GDP at the steady state because we assume
that fertility is at the replacement rate. Notice that there are no jumps in the growth
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rate because many innovations occur within a generation of 40 years such that the law of
large numbers applies over time. Thus, it is not necessary in our framework to assume a
continuum of intermediate firms to avoid discontinuities.
2.2.3 The balanced growth path
Along the balanced growth path, all markets clear and the common long-run growth rate
of technology, output, and consumption is constant. The endogenous consumption-savings
decision of individuals affects the real interest rate and, as obvious from Equation (2.16),
exerts an influence on the demand for research, which affects the number of scientists and
thereby the frequency of quality-improving innovations. This, in turn, determines the
growth rate of the economy. Along the balanced growth path, the time dimension is not
relevant because the growth rate is constant such that we suppress the time index and
the innovation index from now on. The equilibrium dynamics along the balanced growth
path are summarized by the following four-dimensional system of equations that brings
together the demand-side and the supply-side of the economy and allows for determining
the endogenous variables:
gC = (1 + r)βφ− 1, (2.21)
gY = λn · ln(γ), (2.22)
1 = λ
γ
(
1−α
α
)
(L− n)
r + λn
, (2.23)
L = n+
(
α2
ω
) 1
1−α
. (2.24)
Along the balanced growth path, aggregate consumption, cohort consumption, and ag-
gregate output all grow at the same rate such that gC = gY ≡ g in Equations (2.21) and
(2.22).
Using Equations (2.21)–(2.24), we solve for the four unknowns g, r, n, and ω. The
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associated long-run growth rate of the economy boils down to
g = max
{
ln(γ){α + βφ[(α− 1)γλL− α]}
βφ[α(γ − 1)− γ]− α ln(γ) , 0
}
. (2.25)
The first expression within the curly brackets is positive as long as the product of β, λ,
L, φ, and γ is high enough. However, there is the theoretical possibility that research
incentives are too low to sustain a positive growth rate, for example, if the productivity of
researchers, λ, is very low for a given population size, L. Since employment of researchers
and therefore technological progress cannot become negative, we have the lower bound of
zero on the long-run growth rate, as reflected in our formulation of Equation (2.25). This
behavior of the model in the corner solution is in line with the literature that usually em-
ploys similar non-negativity assumptions, either implicitly or explicitly (see, for example,
Romer, 1990; Kuhn and Prettner, 2016). In case of the corner solution, there would not
be any technological progress. However, in actually existing highly developed countries,
this is an empirically irrelevant case because technological progress has been positive in
any 40 year period since the Industrial Revolution.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 The growth effects of increasing longevity
Since we are interested in the consequences of rising life expectancy for long-run economic
growth, we analyze the effect of the survival probability, φ. A higher survival probability
implies a higher life expectancy and also a higher average age in the economy, such that an
increase in φ is tantamount to population aging. We can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. The long-run growth rate (g) increases unambiguously in response to
a higher survival probability (φ).
Proof. The partial derivative of the growth rate with respect to the survival probability
is given by
∂g
∂φ
=
αβ ln(γ){α + γ − αγ + ln(γ)[α + (1− α)γλL]}
[βφ(α + γ − αγ) + α ln(γ)]2 . (2.26)
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The denominator of this expression is always positive. Taking into account that α ∈ (0, 1),
the numerator is also always positive, such that the survival probability has a strictly
positive effect on the long-run growth rate of the economy.
The economic intuition for this finding is that an increase in life expectancy reduces
the generational turnover and therefore raises aggregate savings. Given the higher savings,
the mutual funds can invest more into the shares of intermediate goods companies, which
raises the demand for new innovations. This, in turn, leads to a higher employment level in
the research sector such that the probability of successful innovations within each period
increases. As a consequence, the common long-run growth rate of aggregate consumption
and aggregate output rises.
Interestingly, since higher savings imply a decrease in the interest rate, individual
consumption growth, at first, decreases. This is due to the perfectly insured risk of death:
a change in the survival probability does not affect individual consumption growth directly
but only indirectly via the reduction in the interest rate. A lower interest rate implies
that individual consumption growth decreases. At the cohort level, however, there are
two opposing effects. An increase in φ has a direct positive effect on cohort consumption
growth because of the increase in the number of individuals who survive, whereas the
decrease in the interest rate has an indirect negative effect on cohort consumption growth
via the individual Euler equation. The negative indirect effect of a lower interest rate,
r, only partially offsets the positive direct effect of a higher survival rate, φ. Otherwise,
aggregate savings would not rise and the interest rate could not have decreased in the
first place. That aggregate savings rise and the interest rate decreases are unambiguous
general equilibrium effects. Altogether, therefore, cohort-specific consumption growth
increases with the survival probability. Thus, a rising survival probability reduces the
wedge between individual consumption growth and cohort consumption growth. In the
limit of φ = 1, the individual and the cohort Euler equation are the same. In this case, we
would be back in the standard formulation of an overlapping generations model without
longevity risk in which all individuals die at the age of 100.
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Inspecting the long-run growth rate g in Equation (2.25) shows that the effects of β
and λ are positive, while the effect of α is negative. These results are in line with the
standard literature. The effect of γ is ambiguous, but for reasonably high values of γ, it is
positive because the monopolist enjoys higher rents after an innovation, which eventually
increases the incentives to invest in research.
If mortality risks were only imperfectly insured, our qualitative results would not
change. From a quantitative point of view, the magnitude of the effects would be even
larger. This is due to the following mechanism. Saving becomes less attractive for indi-
viduals if their lifetime risk is only partially insured. As a result, the individual saving
rate and the aggregate saving rate both decrease. Altogether, a rise in life expectancy
would then have a larger positive effect on saving than in the case of fully insured lifetime
risks such that longevity’s impact on economic growth would be stronger.
Our result holds true when individuals save for their own retirement or the social
security system is based on a fully-funded system in which the contributions of individuals
are invested and later paid out as pensions when they retire. The presence of a pay-as-you-
go pension system would lead to a crowding out of individual savings and thereby reduce
the growth effect that is due to our mechanism. However, as long as individual savings
are not fully crowded out by the pension system, the channel that we describe is still
operative and increasing longevity would raise economic growth as stated in Proposition
2.1.
In Figure 2.1, we show the relationship between the growth rate, g, and the survival
probability, φ, for standard parameter values. We normalize the size of the workforce such
that L ≡ 1 to eliminate considerations with respect to the scale of the economy. The choice
of the discount factor β = 0.14 corresponds to a yearly discount rate of approximately
4% and the size of γ = 1.04 implies that every successful quality improvement increases
productivity by 4%. The survival probability is set such that life expectancy corresponds
to the value in the United States of 78.7 years (World Bank, 2016). Finally, we set the
productivity of scientists to λ = 42.5 to fit the implied growth rate of the model to the
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Figure 2.1: Survival probability and the long-run growth rate
actual aggregate growth rate of the United States over 40 years.5
In line with the analytical result stated in Proposition 2.1, we observe a strictly positive
effect of the survival probability on the long-run economic growth rate. Notice that the
effect of the survival probability on economic growth is concave such that the positive effect
of an increase in the survival probability is high for low levels of survival probability, and
low for high levels of survival probability. For very low values of φ, the economy would be
trapped in the corner solution of zero employment in the research sector and a stagnation
of technology.6
To keep our analytical results as simple as possible, we used the special case of loga-
rithmic utility that conforms to an elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) of one.
However, since our general equilibrium effects crucially hinge on the interest rate and
on the individual consumption-savings decision, we examine numerically how changes in
the EIS affect the long-run economic growth rate. According to Chetty (2006), values
for the EIS can vary between 0.5 and 1, while others find the EIS to be even closer to
zero (e.g. Guvenen, 2006). An EIS of one, which corresponds to the logarithmic utility
function, is usually found to be still within the range of plausible values. Table 2.1 shows
the implied growth rates for different values of the EIS and the effect that an increase in
5The large value of λ is due to the normalization of the population size to unity. Alternatively, we
could have assumed a realistic population size and then λ would be much smaller to generate a realistic
economic growth rate. However, both procedures would have led to similar growth rates.
6While one could, in principle, include a depreciation rate of technology to account for technological
regress and negative growth, this would not change any of our arguments above.
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life expectancy has on economic growth for the given EIS. We also include values of the
EIS that are larger than one to assess the sensitivity of our results with respect to this
parameter.
Table 2.1: Sensitivity of the growth rate to changes in the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (EIS)
EIS 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Growth rate (g) 0 0.19 0.5 0.69 0.79 0.85 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.95
Growth effect
of increasing 0 0.041 0.032 0.022 0.015 0.011 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.004
life expectancy
As shown in Table 2.1, economic growth varies positively with the willingness of indi-
viduals to substitute consumption over time. This result is as expected and conforms to
the standard economic growth literature (cf. Romer, 1990). A higher willingness to sub-
stitute consumption over time increases the effect of the interest rate on the saving rate.
Higher savings increase investment in R&D, which eventually raises long-run economic
growth. For very low values of the EIS, the economy is again at the corner solution with
zero growth. When considering different values of the EIS, an increase in life expectancy
of one year always raises economic growth. This confirms that our underlying mechanism
not only holds for the special case of a logarithmic utility function.
2.3.2 The welfare effects of increasing longevity
In our overlapping generations economy in which individual utility rises with consumption,
faster economic growth implies higher welfare at the individual as well as at the aggregate
level. Keeping that in mind, the total welfare gains that are due to increasing longevity
can be decomposed into two separate effects:
(1) As shown in Proposition 2.1, increases in longevity positively impact on productivity
growth and, thus, on the growth rate of the economy. In the long run, this increases
consumption and therefore welfare.
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(2) Individuals do not only derive utility from the higher consumption induced by the
effect of higher life expectancy on economic growth but also from the direct effect
of living longer.
Considering these two channels, it is interesting to analyze their relative importance
depending on the health status of the inhabitants of an economy (measured by φ) and
depending on how developed an economy already is (measured by the level of technology,
At, or by the corresponding wage rate, wt). We do so by comparing how an increase in
longevity of one year, i.e., an increase of φ by 0.025, impacts on the relative importance of
productivity gains for the gains in overall welfare. To this end, we isolate the welfare effect
of productivity gains by calculating the welfare derived from higher consumption due to
higher productivity, given a counterfactually unchanged survival probability. Then we
calculate the relative importance of the welfare effect that is due to productivity gains as
the share of the total increase in welfare that is due to an increase in longevity. Denoting
the share of the welfare increase that is due to rising productivity as WSproductivity, we
have
WSproductivity =
Uproductivity − Uinitial
Unew − Uinitial ,
where Uinitial and Unew are the utility levels before and after the increase in life expectancy
of one year, while Uproductivity is the increase in utility that is induced by increases in
productivity, assuming an unchanged life expectancy. We isolate this effect by allowing
φ to change on the production side of the economy and holding it constant in the utility
function when calculating utility levels.
The three different utility levels required to calculate the welfare shares are obtained
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by the following expressions:
Uinitial = ln(c1,initial) + φβ ln(c2,initial)
+ ln[(1 + ginitial) · c1,initial] + φβ ln[(1 + ginitial) · c2,initial]
+[(1 + ginitial)
2 · c1,initial] + φβ ln[(1 + ginitial)2 · c2,initial],
Unew = ln(c1,new) + (φ+ 0.025)β ln(c2,new)
+ ln[(1 + gnew) · c1,new] + (φ+ 0.025)β ln[(1 + gnew) · c2,new]
+ ln[(1 + gnew)
2 · c1,new] + (φ+ 0.025)β ln[(1 + gnew)2 · c2,new],
Uproductivity = ln(c1,new) + φβ ln(c2,new)
+ ln[(1 + gnew) · c1,new] + φβ ln[(1 + gnew) · c2,new]
+ ln[(1 + gnew)
2 · c1,new] + φβ ln[(1 + gnew)2 · c2,new].
Subscripts 1 and 2 refer to adulthood and retirement, while “initial” and “new” indicate
the consumption level and the growth rate of the economy before and after the increase
in life expectancy by one year. In the expression for Unew we have a survival probability
of φ+ 0.025 because an increase in life expectancy by one year corresponds to an increase
in φ of 0.025. To derive the welfare shares, we take into account the lifetime utility of
three generations, which corresponds to 160 years excluding childhood (80 years of the
first generation and 40 years for each additional generation).
In Table 2.2 we apply this calculation to two economies that resemble parameter values
that lead to income levels and life expectancies as in the United States and as in Russia,
respectively. We adjust initial life expectancy, φ, wage income, w, and the productivity
of researchers, λ, such that our model matches the growth rates of GDP over a period of
40 years in both countries. Afterwards, we derive the corresponding welfare shares and
report the welfare share that is due to changes in productivity.
The importance of longevity gains and productivity gains differ substantially between
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Table 2.2: Decomposition of additional utility for an increase in life expectancy of 1 year
Productivity share
United States Russia
Actual parameter values 24.81% 46.54%
Initial life expectancy reduced by 5 years 37.03% 63.73%
Yearly wage rate reduced by $5,000 24.95% 47.24%
both economies. In the United States, the productivity share of a rise in life expectancy
by one year is 25%, while the direct welfare gains of living longer amount to 75%. For Rus-
sia, the relative importance changes considerably. Almost half of the longevity-induced
welfare gains are due to improvements in productivity growth. Nevertheless, the direct
welfare gains of longevity improvements still exceed the indirect welfare gains due to ris-
ing productivity in the baseline specification. We summarize this result in the following
remark.
Remark 2.1. In highly developed countries, the direct utility gain due to increasing life
expectancy is higher than the indirect utility gain via induced productivity growth.
In a second step, we conduct a comparative statics analysis by separately decreasing
initial life expectancy by five years and wage income by $5000 ceteris paribus. This
allows us to understand how different parameters impact on the relative importance of
both welfare shares. It is obvious that initial life expectancy is most important in that
respect. For both economies, the welfare share of productivity increases considerably
when decreasing initial life expectancy. For Russia, the effect is even more pronounced
than for the United States. Although being smaller in magnitude, the same relationship
holds when considering the wage rate of an economy. Lower initial wages increase the
productivity share and, again, the effect is stronger for Russia than for the United States.
We summarize this finding in the following remark.
Remark 2.2. Improvements in productivity become less important for welfare the better
the health status of the inhabitants of an economy and the more developed an economy
already is.
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This is consistent with the results of Kuhn and Prettner (2016) who show that an
increase of the size of the health sector beyond its growth-maximizing size is actually a
Pareto improvement. In other words, choosing the size of the health care sector solely
by considering its economic growth effect misses the point because it disregards the large
direct welfare effects of higher life expectancy.
Furthermore, the relative welfare gain that is due to living longer increases with the
level of income. This is in line with the result of Hall and Jones (2007) that a continuous
increase in the share of resources devoted to health care is an optimal outcome in the
course of economic development.
2.4 Conclusions
We introduce a demographic structure with three overlapping generations, childhood,
adulthood, and retirement into an endogenous growth model based on vertical innovations.
Furthermore, individuals face an exogenously given survival probability from adulthood
to retirement, which determines life expectancy. We show that increasing longevity leads
to higher aggregate savings, which raises the demand for innovation. This, in turn, leads
to higher employment in the R&D sector, faster technological progress, and a higher long-
run economic growth rate. Our mechanism yields an alternative theoretical explanation
for the positive effects of increasing life expectancy on economic growth in developed
countries as found by Cervellati and Sunde (2011) in their empirical analysis.
We use the resulting framework to assess the welfare effects of rising longevity and
decompose them into the direct welfare effect of living longer, and the indirect welfare
effect of higher consumption due to the induced faster economic growth. We show that
the direct welfare effect tends to be larger than the indirect welfare effect. Furthermore,
the relative importance of the direct welfare effect increases with economic development.
Both of these results are consistent with the recent literature on the welfare maximizing
size of healthcare sectors and on the evolution of optimal expenditures on health care in
the course of economic development.
From a policy perspective, our results show that investments in health care have
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positive direct welfare effects as well as positive side effects on economic growth that both
need to be taken into account when reforming health care systems. Focusing solely on
the growth effects of increasing life expectancy misses a large part of the welfare gains.
These welfare gains become even more important with economic development. Thus, in
assessing the optimal resources to be invested in health care, it is important to adopt a
comprehensive view that considers both the indirect economic growth effects as well as
the direct welfare effects of living longer.
As far as the scope for future research is concerned, we identify the following important
dimensions. First, while our results would not change from a qualitative perspective if
we allowed for imperfect annuitization and for a pay-as-you-go pension system (as long
as there is not a full crowding out of private savings), it could be interesting to assess the
quantitative implications of these aspects in a more thorough numerical analysis. Second,
following the analysis of Kuhn and Prettner (2016) in the horizontal innovation framework,
it might be interesting to introduce an explicit health care sector and to assess its growth-
maximizing and its welfare-maximizing size. Doing so would allow to assess whether
there are differences in the size of growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing health
care sectors between the horizontal innovation framework and the vertical innovation
framework. Finally, to allow for richer demographic dynamics, it could be worthwhile to
introduce endogenous population growth and endogenous education investments along the
lines of Strulik et al. (2013). However, all of these extensions would raise the complexity of
the model considerably such that only numerical results by means of a detailed calibration
exercise could be obtained. Of course, this is beyond the scope of our present paper, which
is mainly concerned with the analytical characterization of the main channels.
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Appendix A: Model solution for a continuum of inter-
mediate goods firms
The model solution in the main text refers to a setting in which output is produced by
using only one intermediate good as input. In this section, we show that the central results
remain valid when assuming a continuum of intermediate goods sectors instead (Aghion
and Howitt, 1999). To be able to derive analytical solutions for this case, however, we
have to use continuous time approximations in the derivation of the long-run economic
growth rate.
Assume, in contrast to the baseline model, that there is one R&D sector for each
intermediate good, with the firms in each research sector competing to discover the next
generation of that particular good. One necessary additional assumption is that, although
the arrival rates in different sectors are independent of each other, innovations are drawn
from the same pool of knowledge, i.e., each new innovation increases the technological
frontier available to all research firms. This ensures that innovations during one period
arrive gradually. Using a continuous time approximation to be able to derive the analytical
solution of the long-run economic growth rate, the labor market clearing condition and
the research arbitrage condition are given by
L = n+
(1− α)
(
α2
ω
) 1
1−α
1 + ln(γ)− α , (2.27)(
α2
ω
) 1
α−1
=
λ1−α
α
r + λn+ α
1−αλn ln(γ)
. (2.28)
The main difference to the baseline model is the crowding out effect, represented by λn
in the denominator of Equation (2.28). This is a consequence of the competition between
the sectors because lower monopoly profits reduce the incentives to invest in R&D. The
number of researchers across all sectors is the same because the expected payoffs in all
research sectors are identical. The flow of innovations can, therefore, still be expressed as
gt = λ · nt · ln γ. (2.29)
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Since the new production structure does not affect the consumption-savings behavior of
the households, the long-run growth rate of the economy is given by
g = max
{
(1− α) log(γ){βφ[(1− α)λL+ α] + βλLφ log(γ)− α}
log(γ)[(1− α)α(1− βφ) + βφ] + (1− α)βφ , 0
}
. (2.30)
The effect of population aging, as represented by an increase in the survival probability
(φ) is still unambiguously positive. This is formulated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2. If there is a continuum of intermediate goods sectors instead of a single
sector in our vertical innovation economic growth model with overlapping generations, the
long-run growth rate (g) still increases in response to a higher survival probability (φ).
Proof. The partial derivative of the growth rate with respect to the survival probability
is given by
∂g
∂φ
=
(1− α)αβ log(γ)[1 + log(γ)− α][(1− α)λL log(γ) + 1]
{(α− 1)βφ− log(γ)[(1− α)α(1− βφ) + βφ]}2 . (2.31)
The denominator of this expression is always positive. Since 0 < α < 1, the numerator is
also always positive such that the survival probability has a strictly positive effect on the
long-run growth rate of the economy.
The economic intuition is identical to the one in the baseline case with only one
intermediate good. An increase in the probability to survive raises aggregate savings.
Higher savings induce higher investments into shares of intermediate goods companies.
This, in turn, raises the demand for innovation and, thus, for scientists. Having a larger
number of scientists in the economy raises the frequency at which new innovations occur,
increasing the long-run growth rate of aggregate consumption and of output. As apparent
from Table 2.3, the growth effect of increasing life expectancy is still positive for different
values of the EIS.
The welfare effects of increasing longevity are reported in Table 2.4. The slightly larger
productivity shares, as compared to the one-sector model, are a result of the crowding
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Table 2.3: Sensitivity of the growth rate to changes in the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (EIS)
EIS 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Growth rate (g) 0 0.2 0.51 0.69 0.79 0.86 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.95
Growth effect
of increasing 0 0.042 0.032 0.022 0.015 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.005
life expectancy
out effect mentioned above, which reduces the incentives to invest in research. This, in
turn, increases the productivity share in the welfare analysis.
Table 2.4: Decomposition of additional utility for an increase in life expectancy of 1 year,
multi-sector approach
Productivity share
United States Russia
Actual parameter values 29.21% 48.99%
Initial life expectancy reduced by 5 years 41.58% 68.15%
Yearly wage rate reduced by $5,000 29.37% 49.69%
To summarize, the introduction of a continuum of intermediate goods does not change
our baseline results from a qualitative perspective and only slightly from a quantitative
perspective. While the multi-sector case is arguably more realistic, it comes at the cost
of using a continuous time approximation to be able to calculate analytical results.
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CHAPTER 3
Endogenous Life Expectancy and R&D-based Economic Growth∗
∗This chapter is my own work and is under revision at the Journal of Population Economics.
Abstract
We propose an overlapping generations framework in which life expectancy is determined
endogenously by governmental health investments. As a novelty, we are able to examine
the feedback effects between life expectancy and R&D-driven economic growth for the
transitional dynamics. We find that i) higher survival induces economic growth through
higher savings and higher labor force participation; ii) longevity-induced reductions in
fertility hamper economic development; iii) the positive life expectancy effects of larger
savings and higher labor force participation outweigh the negative effect of a reduction
in fertility, and iv) there exists a growth-maximizing size of the health care sector that
might lie beyond what is observed in most countries. Altogether, the results support a
rather optimistic view on the relationship between life expectancy and economic growth
and contribute to the debate surrounding rising health shares and economic development.
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3.1 Introduction
Over the past decades, mortality has decreased at an historically unprecedented pace all
over the world. As depicted in Figure 3.1, on a global level, life expectancy at birth
has increased from 52.6 years in 1960 to 72.4 years in 2017. Nonetheless, substantial
differences between different regions of the world remain. Over the same time period, the
real GDP p.c. has risen roughly by a factor of 3.5 from $4,254 to $14,574 (Roser, 2019).
Figure 3.1: Life expectancy at birth, 1960–2017
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Source: World Bank (2019)
In the literature, the following important reasons for increasing life expectancy have
been proposed: medical progress, economic development, increased health shares and
behavioral changes (see, for example, Christensen and Vaupel, 1996; Harper, 2014; Currie
and Schwandt, 2016; Dwyer-Lindgren et al., 2017). However, the dynamic interrelations
between life expectancy and economic development are less clear.
Economists have tried to shed light on the correlation and causality between health
and income. The Preston curve (see Preston, 1975) provides interesting insights by high-
lighting the positive correlation between the development status and the health status
of a country, which flattens out for high levels of income. Furthermore, as Bloom et al.
(2019) show, the Preston curve has shifted upwards between 1960 and 2015 and still ex-
hibits a strong positive correlation. All this points to a relationship between health and
income that requires further investigation. In a prominent work, Acemoglu and Johnson
(2007) find a negative relationship between health and economic growth by exploiting
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the epidemiological transition after 1940. However, this result got challenged by several
contributions. Critiques by Aghion et al. (2011) and Bloom et al. (2014) mainly empha-
size the role of initial health that is not considered in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007).
In fact, Cervellati and Sunde (2011, 2015) show that the effect of health on economic
growth hinges on a country’s stage of the demographic transition. Economic growth in
less developed countries with high mortality and fertility might even decrease in better
health because longer lifetimes do not decrease fertility or raise educational investments.
Therefore, higher survival primarily raises the population size, potentially affecting p.c.
income negatively. Focusing on high income countries, the relationship between health
and economic growth reverses since higher survival reduces population growth and spurs
human capital investments. This negative relationship is also supported by various other
works (for example Lorentzen et al., 2008; Cervellati and Sunde, 2013; Bloom et al., 2014;
Hansen and Lønstrop, 2015; Gehringer and Prettner, 2019). Given the tremendous im-
provements in health care during large parts of the twentieth century, infant and child
mortality is contributing less and less to gains in life expectancy in high income coun-
tries, leaving decreases in old-age mortality as the main engine for future increases in
individual life spans (Breyer et al., 2010; Eggleston and Fuchs, 2012). Also, since health
care sectors in high income countries are usually well-developed, additional gains in life
expectancy come at ever higher cost, thereby raising the opportunity cost of health care,
e.g. productive investments (Bhargava et al., 2001).
To analyze the complex relationship within models of economic growth, two dimen-
sions can be distinguished – exogenous vs. endogenous life expectancy and exogenous vs.
endogenous growth frameworks. There already exists quite a rich literature on exogenous
life expectancy effects in both exogenous and endogenous growth models (see, for exam-
ple, Blanchard, 1985; Reinhart, 1999; Heijdra and Romp, 2008; Prettner, 2013; Baldanzi
et al., 2019). These models usually emphasize the saving effect, the role of human cap-
ital and the corresponding effects on productivity and provide an important basis for a
better understanding of the consequences of changes in the lifetime horizon for economic
growth. Nonetheless, no feedback effects on longevity can be considered, which limits the
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models’ explanatory power. Life expectancy has been endogenized mostly in exogenous
growth models as in Boucekkine et al. (2002), Chakraborty (2004) and Fanti and Gori
(2014), where life expectancy increases in the public resources directed toward health or
in the level of human capital. Given the endogenous nature of technological progress,
these models are also limited in their explanatory power. Last, there is the category of
models incorporating both endogenous survival and endogenous growth. Contributions
from this category are rare. A recent paper by Kuhn and Prettner (2016) introduces
individual survival into a Romer (1990) type of economy, where life expectancy increases
in the health care personnel. The authors find a hump-shaped relationship between the
size of the health care sector (which determines life expectancy) and economic growth.
However, in their analysis they solely focus on balanced growth path effects with constant
fertility and an exogenous health care sector.
To provide additional insights, we fully endogenize life expectancy similar to Chakraborty
(2004) and combine it with a discrete time endogenous growth framework in the vein of
Romer (1990) and Jones (1995). Old-age life expectancy increases in output per worker
as well as in the health tax levied by the government. Additionally, there is a quantity-
quality trade-off in the sense that adults have to decide on the number of children to have
as well as on the children’s education. We include three channels through which changes
in the survival probability (and vice versa) can affect economic development: the saving
rate, fertility and labor force participation. Given an increase in the lifetime horizon,
individuals save a larger fraction of their income to account for the prolonged retirement
period (Bloom et al., 2007, 2010). To finance the increase in savings, adult consumption
and fertility decrease and labor force participation increases (for works on the fertility and
labor force participation effects of health see Zhang and Zhang, 2005; Angeles, 2010; Cai,
2010; Garc´ıa-Go´mez, 2011). We show that, in principle, longer individual lifespans foster
economic growth, as the positive saving and labor force participation effects outweigh the
negative fertility effect. For a constant survival probability as well as for an over-sized
health care sector, economic growth slows down.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we set up the model structure
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by implementing endogenous life expectancy into a R&D-based growth framework. In
Section 3.3, the balanced growth path is derived analytically. In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we
calibrate the model to U.S. data and use the results to further investigate the feedback
effects between life expectancy and economic growth. Finally, in Section 3.6, we draw
conclusions and discuss potentials for future research.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Consumption side
In the vein of Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965), the economy is populated by three
single-sex overlapping generations: children, young adults and retirees. Childhood lasts
for 20 years, adulthood for 40 years and, depending on the probability to survive to old
age, φt, retirement lasts for up to 40 years.
1 Consequently, the maximum possible lifespan
an individual can reach is 100 years. This is as in Baldanzi et al. (2019) with the exception
that life expectancy is determined endogenously according to
φt =
bt
1 + bt
,
with bt being the health status of an adult. We closely follow Chakraborty (2004), such
that bt increases in the public resources devoted to health (see also Preston, 1975; Wolfe,
1986; Lichtenberg, 2004). The survival probability has the following properties
• ∂φt(bt)
∂bt
> 0,
• lim
bt→0
φt (bt) = 0,
• lim
bt→∞
φt (bt) = 1.
There is a strictly concave non-decreasing relationship between governmental health in-
vestments and life expectancy. In the limits, if φ = 0, the corresponding life expectancy
1Focusing on well-developed countries only, we assume that all children survive to adulthood. For
interrelations between economic development, fertility and child mortality see Cigno (1998).
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equals 60 years and if φ = 1, individuals reach the maximum life expectancy of 100 years
with certainty.
As a simplification, all economically relevant decisions are made by the adult genera-
tion. We implicitly assume that children’s consumption needs are covered for by parental
consumption. Adults supply up to one unit of labor and, exactly after half of their adult
period, give birth to n number of children who will become adults when their parents
finish adulthood. Retirees consume out of the savings accumulated and die with certainty
at the end of the period, leaving zero bequests. Maximum lifetime utility is then deter-
mined by a consumption-saving decision and by choosing the number of children, nt, to
have and the children’s educational level, et. Consequently, individual utility is given by
ut = ln(c1,t) + φtβ ln(c2,t+1) + ξ ln(nt) + θ ln(et), (3.1)
where c1,t is adult consumption in period t, c2,t+1 is old-age consumption in period t + 1
and β, ξ, θ ∈ (0, 1) are the utility weights of old-age consumption, fertility and children’s
education, respectively. Individuals need to satisfy two constraints
(1− ψnt − ηntet)wtht = c1,t + st, (3.2)
stRt+1
φt
= c2,t+1. (3.3)
Equation (3.2) describes the economic constraint of an adult. Labor income depends on
the wage rate per effective labor, wt, on the level of individual human capital, ht, and
on the labor force participation rate, 1 − ψnt − ηntet. As in Galor and Weil (2000),
we assume that labor supply decreases in the fertility rate to account for the time spent
raising children. Furthermore, as a simplification, we follow Prettner and Werner (2016) in
assuming home education.2 Consequently, labor force participation decreases in the time
cost of raising children, ψ, in education, et, and in the time requirements for educating
children, η. Labor income of an adult in period t can then be spent on consumption
2To slim down the model and to put the spotlight on life expectancy effects, we abstract from baseline
education that children acquire without formal schooling as in Strulik et al. (2013).
Chapter 3. Endogenous life expectancy 52
during adulthood and on savings, st, for retirement.
Equation (3.3) captures individual old-age consumption. As in standard overlapping
generations frameworks, the only self-determined source of income during retirement are
interest payments on the savings accumulated in the previous period. This is reflected
in stRt+1. To account for individuals’ savings who die before reaching retirement, we
follow Yaari (1965), Blanchard (1985), Chakraborty (2004) and Baldanzi et al. (2019)
and implement perfect and fair annuity markets which insure individuals against the risk
of dying with positive bequests before reaching the retirement stage. More specifically,
at the end of adulthood, all adults invest their savings in a mutual life insurance fund.
Individuals who survive to retirement receive two transfers, their deposited savings and
transfers of individuals’ savings who died. This is accounted for by dividing stRt+1 by φt.
3
In so doing, the individual saving behavior reflects the exact anticipated life expectancy.
Combining Equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3), utility maximization yields the following
optimality conditions
c1,t =
wtht
1 + ξ + βφt
, st =
βφtwtht
1 + ξ + βφt
,
(3.4)
nt =
ξ − θ
ψ(1 + ξ + βφt)
, et =
θψ
η(ξ − θ) .
First and foremost, the wage rate per effective labor, wt, and the level of individual human
capital, ht, increase adult consumption and savings but have no direct effect on the fertility
and education decisions. This is due to fertility and education being modeled in terms
of time-opportunity cost rather than in terms of absolute cost. There is an income-
independent quantity-quality trade-off, which is reflected in the optimality conditions for
nt and et. While the preferences for children, ξ, raise fertility, they decrease educational
efforts. The reverse holds true for the preferences for education, θ. For the reminder of
the paper, ξ > θ is assumed to rule out negative fertility rates.
The effects of the survival probability, φt, are similar to the ones of the individual
3Although, we do not explicitly include a pension system, the annuity dynamics are in line with
Cipriani (2014) who finds a negative relationship between population aging and financial transfers received
during retirement.
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discount factor, β. A change in life expectancy induces the same individual behavior –
the higher the probability to survive to old age, the less individuals discount utility de-
rived from future consumption. Therefore, both β and φt increase savings and decrease
consumption of adults. Also, fertility decreases in β and φt since a higher preference
for future consumption decreases the willingness of adults to free resources for children.
These relationships are well-known from previous works (Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002;
Zhang and Zhang, 2005; Chen, 2010). However, since our survival probability is endoge-
nous, its marginal effects change as the economy is growing. Therefore, the incentives to
save and to have children change over time, which, in turn, affects research and produc-
tion. Given that capital accumulation, population growth and technological progress are
fundamental drivers of economic development (Ramsey, 1928; Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965;
Koopmans, 1965; Romer, 1990), implementing an endogenous life expectancy improves
our understanding of economic growth processes.
Inspecting the fertility rate more closely, we observe that it is constant in the long run
if the economy experiences sustained economic growth.
nt =

ξ−θ
ψ(1+ξ+β)
for limbt→∞ φt (bt) = 1,
ξ−θ
ψ(1+ξ+βφt)
otherwise.
The same framework without lifetime uncertainty would yield a constant fertility rate from
the beginning on. The effect of economic development on fertility would be abrogated
which can be reasonable if focusing solely on advanced economies that have exhibited
low and relatively constant fertility rates over the last few decades (Prettner and Werner,
2016). By introducing an endogenously determined life expectancy, it is possible to sepa-
rate the longevity effect on fertility decisions from the income effect on fertility decisions,
which leads us to Remark 3.1.
Remark 3.1. Increases in life expectancy induce higher savings for retirement at the
expense of reduced fertility.
These relationships are in line with the literature surrounding longevity and economic
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growth (see Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002; Zhang and Zhang, 2005; Cervellati and Sunde,
2005). Given that children born in period t become adults in period t+ 1, the size of the
labor force, Lt, evolves according to
Lt+1 =
ξ − θ
ψ(1 + ξ + βφt)
Lt.
Again, for sustained economic growth, life expectancy will be at its upper limit such that
population growth is constant in the long run. Turning towards human capital creation,
the law of motion for individual human capital is given by
ht+1 = AEetht.
Since home education is assumed, parents’ level of human capital, ht, the educational
effort, et, and parents’ productivity in education, AE, determine the level of individual
human capital of the next generation. Economy-wide aggregate human capital is then
given by
Ht = htLt, (3.5)
and the labor force participation rate can be expressed as
Ωt =
1 + βφt
1 + ξ + βφt
. (3.6)
Combining Equations (3.5) and (3.6), the stock of aggregate human capital available for
production and R&D, H˜t, can be calculated as
H˜t = ΩtHt. (3.7)
The available stock of aggregate human capital determines overall labor input. Since
the labor force participation rate increases but fertility decreases in life expectancy, the
long-run effect is ambiguous and requires further investigation. We go into more details
Chapter 3. Endogenous life expectancy 55
in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
3.2.2 Government
Similar to Barro (1990), the government finances its health spending by taxing aggregate
income, Y aggt , with a health tax, τ . It needs to keep a balanced budget at all times, i.e.,
health investments can only be financed by the tax income received in the same period.
The governmental constraint then reads
τY aggt = Bt,
where the left-hand side are aggregate governmental revenues and the right-hand side
is aggregate governmental health spending, Bt. Incorporating a medical technology, λ,
and remembering that the government only aims at improving adults’ health, the health
status of an adult is given by
bt = λ
Bt
Lt
.
Individuals’ health and, with it, the probability to survive to retirement increases in the
medical resources per adult invested and in the productivity of these investments.
3.2.3 Production side
The production side of the economy builds up on Romer (1990), Jones (1995) and Prettner
and Werner (2016). There are three sectors: the final goods sector, the intermediate
goods sector and the R&D sector. In short, employing scientists, new ideas/blueprints
are developed in the perfectly competitive R&D sector and are sold to an intermediate
goods producer who then becomes the monopolist in producing that specific product
for one period. The intermediate good of variant i, xit, is produced in a one-for-one
technology using physical capital, kt, as the only input. Due to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
monopolistic competition, the intermediate good is sold with a mark-up over the market
price to the final goods producer. The operating profits are necessary to compensate for
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R&D expenses.4 The final goods producer uses the intermediate good as well as final
goods workers as inputs to produce the final good under perfect competition.
Life expectancy affects productivity and production through two channels: aggregate
savings, St = stLt, and the available aggregate human capital, H˜t. Longevity-induced
changes in the saving behavior affect the capital that can be invested in intermediate
goods companies, which, in turn, affects the production of new blueprints and final goods
production. The size of the labor force and with it also R&D and final goods production,
is affected twofold: on the one hand, through fertility, increases in life expectancy reduce
the future size of the workforce, on the other hand, fewer children increase labor force
participation.
The final good, Yt, is produced according to
Yt = (1− τ)
(
HYt
)1−α At∑
i=1
(
xit
)α
,
where HYt denotes workers employed in final goods production, At is the number of
differentiated blueprints developed until time t, xit is the number of machines for each
blueprint i used in final goods production and α is the elasticity of final output with
respect to machines. We include (1 − τ) to account for the governmental health tax.5
Perfect competition ensures that all production factors are paid their marginal value
products, such that the wage per effective worker, wYt , and the price for machines of type
i, pit, are given by, respectively
wYt =
∂Yt
∂HYt
= (1− α)(1− τ) (HYt )−α At∑
i=1
(
xit
)α
, (3.8)
pY,it =
∂Yt
∂xit
= α(1− τ) (HYt )1−α (xit)α−1 . (3.9)
Turning to the monopolistic intermediate goods sector, the profit function of intermediate
4The monopolist only owns the patent for one period. For all future periods, we assume that the
government sells the patent and invests the proceeds unproductively.
5This formulation corresponds to the government taxing capital and labor income at equal rates.
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goods producer i, pix,it , reads
pix,it = p
Y,i
t x
i
t −Rtxit. (3.10)
Combining Equations (3.9) and (3.10) and using kit = x
i
t, profit maximization results in
∂pix,it
∂kit
= 0 ⇔ pit =
Rt
α
. (3.11)
The more differentiated the intermediate goods are, i.e., the smaller α is, the more market
power the monopolist has and the higher the mark-up over the market price is. Since all
monopolists are similar, we can infer from Equation (3.11) that all monopolists charge the
same price and produce the same amount, i.e., pit = pt and x
i
t = xt. Therefore, dropping
the machine variety index i, the aggregate production function can be written as
Yt = (1− τ)
(
AtH
Y
t
)1−α
Kαt ,
where Kt = Atkt is aggregate capital. The production function has now the same Cobb-
Douglas form as in standard neoclassical growth models (see, for example, Solow, 1956).
Moving on to the R&D sector, new ideas are developed according to the following
knowledge production function
At+1 − At = δAχtHAt . (3.12)
HAt are scientists employed in R&D. Their productivity depends on the general produc-
tivity in research, δ, and on the number of already existing ideas (standing on shoulders
effect). We allow for intertemporal knowledge spillovers χ ∈ (0, 1) to partly nest the Jones
(1995) framework. Given the price of a patent, pAt , and the wage rate per effective labor
of scientists, wAt , the profit function in the R&D sector is given by
piAt = p
A
t δA
χ
tH
A
t − wAt HAt .
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Perfect competition then allows to derive an expression for wAt .
∂piAt
∂HAt
= 0 ⇔ wAt = pAt δAχt . (3.13)
The wage per effective labor of scientists depends on the price that can be charged for
one blueprint and on scientists’ overall productivity.
3.2.4 Market clearing
The first condition for an equilibrium is that operating profits of the intermediate goods
producer, pixt , and the price of a patent, p
A
t , equal. Combining Equations (3.9), (3.10) and
(3.11), we observe that this relationship holds for
pAt = pi
x
t = α(1− α)
Yt
At
. (3.14)
The second condition for an equilibrium is that wages of workers and scientists equal,
wYt = w
A
t = wt. Equating Equations (3.8) and (3.13) and using Equation (3.14), we derive
an equilibrium condition for aggregate human capital employed in final goods production
HYt =
A1−χt
δα
. (3.15)
Considering that human capital is solely employed in final goods production and in R&D,
HAt is given as
HAt = H˜t −HYt . (3.16)
Inserting Equations (3.7) and (3.15) into Equation (3.16), we are able to derive an ex-
pression for aggregate human capital employed in R&D
HAt = ΩtHt −
A1−χt
δα
. (3.17)
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Using Equation (3.17) in the knowledge production function, the equilibrium stock of
ideas evolves according to
At+1 = δA
χ
t ΩtHt − At
(
1− α
α
)
. (3.18)
Defining a growth rate as gx,t = (xt+1−xt)/xt, the growth rate of new ideas, gA,t, is given
by
gA,t = δA
χ−1
t ΩtHt −
1
α
. (3.19)
Since we are interested in the growth effects of changes in life expectancy, we inspect Equa-
tion (3.19) with respect to φt. We observe that the survival probability enters through
the labor force participation rate, Ωt, which leads us to the following remark.
Remark 3.2. In the short run, through higher labor force participation, higher life ex-
pectancy increases the rate at which new ideas are developed.
Proof. The partial derivative of gA,t with respect to the survival probability, φt, is given
by
∂gA,t
∂φt
= δAχ−1t Ht
βξ
(1 + ξ + βφt)2
.
The denominator of this expression is always positive. For δ, β, ξ ∈ (0, 1) and for the
reasonable case of At > 0 and Ht > 0, the numerator is also positive, such that the
survival probability has a strictly positive effect on productivity growth in the short
run.
Last, capital accumulation needs to be derived. For full depreciation of physical capital
and since savings of period t are invested in period t+ 1, the standard law of motion for
capital can be applied, where aggregate savings determine the stock of aggregate physical
capital in the next period
Kt+1 = stLt.
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Combining Equations (3.8) and (3.15), the wage rate per effective labor can be written
as
wt = (1− α)(1− τ)A1−αt Kαt
(
A1−χt
δα
)−α
.
Together with the expression for individual savings, st, from Equation (3.4), the stock of
physical capital then evolves according to
Kt+1 = Ltht
βφt
1 + ξ + βφt
(1− α)(1− τ)A1−αt Kαt
(
A1−χt
δα
)−α
.
The survival probability, φt, enters positively through the propensity to save, βφt/(1 +
ξ + βφt). Economic progress that raises life expectancy entails a multiplying effect, since
a longer life span increases capital accumulation and, with it, economic progress and life
expectancy.
To sum up, for labor market and financial market clearing, we have the following
system of equations that describes how our model economy evolves over time
At+1 = δA
χ
t
1 + βφt
1 + ξ + βφt
htLt − At1− α
α
,
Kt+1 = Ltht
βφt
1 + ξ + βφt
(1− α)(1− τ)A1−αt Kαt
(
A1−χt
δα
)−α
,
Y Aggt+1 =
(
A2−χt+1
δα
)1−α
Kαt+1,
Lt+1 = Lt
ξ − θ
ψ(1 + ξ + βφt)
,
ht+1 =
AEθψ
η(ξ − θ)ht,
φt+1 =
λτ
Y Aggt+1
Lt+1
1 + λτ
Y Aggt+1
Lt+1
.
For a given set of parameters and by choosing initial values for the endogenous variables
A0, K0, L0 and h0, this system fully describes the evolution of our model economy over
time. Life expectancy, represented by the survival probability φt+1, is, of course, also
endogenous but is completely determined inside the model.
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3.3 Balanced growth path
The system above can be solved analytically by deriving its balanced growth path (BGP).
Along the BGP, gx,t = gx,t+1 = gx must hold. In the limit, the survival probability
approaches
lim
yt→∞
φt (yt) = 1,
such that we can drop it in the BGP analysis. Accordingly, fertility is constant and the
growth rate of the labor force is given by
gL =
Lt+1
Lt
− 1 = ξ − θ
ψ(1 + ξ + β)
− 1.
The growth rate of individual human capital is also constant and given by
gh =
ht+1
ht
− 1 = AE θψ
η(ξ − θ) − 1.
For a constant labor force participation rate, the growth rate of new ideas can be derived
as
gA,t =
At+1
At
− 1 = δAχ−1t
1 + β
1 + ξ + β
htLt − 1
α
.
Setting gA,t = gA,t+1 and solving for gA, the BGP expression reads
gA =
[
AEθ
η(1 + ξ + β)
] 1
1−χ
− 1,
where the term in square brackets represents the growth factor of aggregate human capital.
The BGP expressions for physical capital and for aggregate production can be derived in
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the same way and read
gK =
[
AEθ
η(1 + ξ + β)
] 2−χ
1−χ
− 1,
gY agg =
[
AEθ
η(1 + ξ + β)
] 2−χ
1−χ
− 1,
where we note that gK = gY agg . Since there are no life expectancy effects in the long
run, which seems reasonable considering that life expectancy gains are slowing down (see
Olshansky et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2016), economic progress is solely driven by growth
in aggregate human capital and in the intertemporal knowledge spillovers. This result is
similar to Prettner and Werner (2016). We summarize this is in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. As the economy progresses, life expectancy reaches an upper limit, such
that there are no more longevity-induced growth effects in the long run.
This proposition has to be treated with some caution. From an analytical perspective,
setting φ = 1 in the long run is correct, however, it ignores level effects and, most
importantly, it ignores that life expectancy is still projected to further increase over the
next decades (Oeppen et al., 2002; Strulik and Vollmer, 2013; Kontis et al., 2017). To
account for that, we examine the transitional dynamics in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
3.4 Simulation
To analyze the transitional dynamics and to discuss the plausibility of our results, we
compare the model dynamics to U.S. data over the period 1960–2017. Given the scope
of the paper, we aim at resembling developments in p.c. GDP, life expectancy at birth,
fertility and the population size. All data have been taken from the World Bank (2019).
The parameter and initial values chosen are summarized in Table 3.1. The health tax
rate is set to 11.4%, which corresponds to the average U.S. national health expenditure as
percentage of GDP over the chosen time horizon (CMS.gov, 2019). The discount factor
of β = 0.67 implies an annual discount rate of 2%, which is in line with Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987). The value of the elasticity of final output with respect to intermediate
Chapter 3. Endogenous life expectancy 63
inputs, α, is set to 0.3, which is close to the standard value used in the literature (Jones,
1995; Acemoglu, 2009). Also, ψ = 0.08 is similar to Strulik et al. (2013). All other values
are chosen for the model to fit the U.S. data as precisely as possible.
Table 3.1: Parameter and initial values for the simulation
Parameter Value Parameter Value Variable Value
τ 0.114 α 0.3 A0 17.5
β 0.67 δ 6.5 K0 0.8
ψ 0.08 χ 0.076 L0 10
ξ 0.327 AE 1.65 h0 1
θ 0.181 η 0.16
λ 0.9
To ensure sure that the model resembles the economic development of the U.S. reason-
ably well, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show to the evolution of p.c. output and of the population
size in the data (dashed red line) and in the model (solid blue line). Keeping in mind
that the model economy consists of three overlapping generations, the model population
size needs to be derived first. We do so by calculating the size of the entire population
in period t as Popt = φt−1Lt−1 + Lt + 0.5ntLt, where the first term refers to retirees, the
second term are adults and the third term represents children. The model p.c. GDP is
then calculated by dividing aggregate output by the population size, i.e., yt = Y
agg
t /Popt.
We observe that p.c. GDP in the data and in the model increase over time by a factor of
three, approximately. In the data, p.c. GDP growth accelerates in the 1980’s and 1990’s
and partially slows down afterwards. In the model, a similar trend is visible. Economic
progress is strong until around the year 2000 when the dot-com bubble burst and slows
down afterwards. Also, the increase in the size of the population matches the one in the
U.S.
Turning to the underlying driving forces of economic growth, changes in life expectancy
are of the main interest. U.S. life expectancy has been rising by approximately nine years
from 1960–2010 and is stagnant since then. In Figure 3.4, the model life expectancy
resembles the data quite well, only underestimating the slowdown during the last decade.
Chapter 3. Endogenous life expectancy 64
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
P.
c.
 o
ut
pu
t
Figure 3.2: Evolution of p.c. output (model prediction: solid blue line; data: dashed red
line)
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of the population size (model prediction: solid blue line; data:
dashed red line)
A critical examination, however, calls for caution. The stagnant U.S. life expectancy is
not driven by stagnant economic development (as the model would suggest) but by several
other aspects such as increased rates of deaths of despair and unequal access to health
services (Case and Deaton, 2015; Dowell et al., 2017; Harper et al., 2017) that are out of
the scope of this paper. Given the positive effect of life expectancy on economic growth,
discussed in Section 3.5, and also supported by other studies (Lorentzen et al., 2008;
Cervellati and Sunde, 2013; Bloom et al., 2014), this result should rather be an incentive
for governments to improve health services in order to not only decrease mortality but to
also promote long-run growth. This conclusion is consistent with Baldanzi et al. (2019)
where increases in life expectancy increase both productivity and individual utility derived
from living longer. We further elaborate on that in the next section.
Figure 3.5 visualizes the fertility effects of changes in the lifetime horizon. Fertility
data are transformed into the number of unisex adults to make them comparable to the
model results. In the data, there is a sharp decrease in fertility until the mid 1970’s visible.
Afterwards, fertility fluctuates just below the replacement level. Obviously, in the model,
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of life expectancy (model prediction: solid blue line; data: dashed
red line)
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Figure 3.5: Evolution of fertility (model prediction: solid blue line; data: dashed red line)
the longevity-induced fertility decline is not able to explain the sharp decrease we see in
the data. However, the life expectancy effect becomes visible. For the chosen parameter
values, over time, the model fertility rate declines to 0.91 along the BGP and approaches
the fertility rate that we observe in the data. Remembering that the change in the model
fertility is solely driven by changes in life expectancy, there is another possible takeaway.
The unisex U.S. fertility rate has fallen by 0.95, while the model fertility rate has fallen
by 0.13. Accordingly, the model captures approximately 14% of the changes in fertility
over that time horizon, which leads us to Remark 3.3.
Remark 3.3. The model result suggests that over the period 1960–2017, 14% of the
observed decline in the U.S. fertility rate is due to increases in life expectancy.
This result can be explained as follows. The quantity-quality trade-off initiated
through increases in income is usually assumed to be the main driver for reductions
in fertility (Becker and Lewis, 1973). Through the design of our model economy, this
trade-off is non-existent over time and the only time-dependent effect remaining is how a
change in the lifetime horizon affects individual choices. In our case, as life expectancy
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increases, individuals require higher savings for old-age consumption. In a standard over-
lapping generations setting, reduced adult consumption would be the only effect. In our
setting, individuals additionally have the opportunity to increase their lifetime earnings
by working more, i.e., by increasing the labor force participation rate. Therefore, they
choose to have fewer children in order to increase labor income. Although, this is typically
not the main motivation for having fewer children, it is one piece of the puzzle to explain
fertility behavior and its economic implications.
3.5 Comparative statics
From the previous analysis it has become clear that, in our framework, life expectancy
exhibits growth effects through savings, fertility and labor force participation. However,
their magnitudes and interrelations have yet to be discussed. In a dynamic general equi-
librium setting, as in the present work, it is next to impossible to exactly determine the
overall effect analytically. To provide an intuitive example, consider an increase in the
health tax τ . We have shown that, as a response, immediately life expectancy and, with
it, labor force participation and the saving rate increase. Therefore, higher available hu-
man capital, H˜t = ΩtLt, raises productivity and income for the next period. Given the
dynamic effects on H˜ over time, the change in the size of the labor force needs to be con-
sidered, too. An increase in life expectancy decreases fertility and, thus, the future size
of the labor force. Assuming, for now, that life expectancy remains constant in the next
period, the effect of a longevity-induced change in fertility in period t on the aggregate
stock of human capital in period t+ 1 can be calculated as
H˜t+1 = (1− ntψ − ntηe)ntLtht+1,
∂H˜t+1
∂nt
= (1− 0.358nt)Ltht+1,
where we use the parameter values from Section 3.4. Only for a model fertility rate of
n > 2.79, the positive effect of higher labor force participation will outweigh the negative
effect of a smaller labor force. Since this corresponds to an actual fertility rate of 5.58,
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one could expect that, for reasonable fertility rates, aggregate available human capital
decreases in life expectancy and exerts a negative impulse on economic development.
This, however, ignores longevity-induced changes in period t+ 1. Given that an increase
in life expectancy raises labor force participation and savings in period t, productivity
and capital available for investments in period t + 1 will be higher. This, in turn, raises
period t + 1 production and therefore also t + 1 life expectancy. The question at hand
is whether the longevity-induced increases in technology and capital can outweigh the
negative effects on labor supply. This strongly depends on many other aspects, such as
further endogenous changes in labor force participation or the effects of the reduction in
savings caused by a higher health tax.
To shed some light on the directions and the magnitudes of the described channels, we
test how p.c. output in the calibrated model changes if life expectancy is kept completely
constant, respectively, if only single channels are switched off. As displayed in Figure 3.6,
in the baseline case with a fully endogenous survival probability, p.c. output increases by
a factor of 2.93. To asses the overall effect, we keep the economy-wide life expectancy in
1960 constant and observe a reduction in p.c. output of 11.9% over 58 years. This result
comes as expected and is in line with the central conclusions of many other works (see,
for example, Chakraborty, 2004; Cervellati and Sunde, 2011; Prettner, 2013; Prettner and
Trimborn, 2017). Without any longevity-induced effects over time, there is less innovation
and less capital, which drags down growth in the economy.
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Chapter 3. Endogenous life expectancy 68
In a second step, we are interested in disentangling the aggregate life expectancy effect.
We do so by keeping the survival probability in savings, labor force participation and
fertility constant, separately and sequentially. First of all, we notice that all channels point
in the expected directions. As life expectancy is switched off in labor force participation,
p.c. output decreases to 2.82. The effect is even stronger for savings, where p.c. output
in 2017 would only be at 2.42 times the level in 1960. Combining both channels, the
reduction in p.c. output amounts to 0.57 or 19.5% in total. For fertility, the opposite
effect can be observed. Ignoring the effect of changes in longevity on the fertility decision,
p.c. output increases by 0.008 because of a larger workforce, which translates into a
higher growth rate of new ideas. This change seems reasonably small considering that
only longevity-induced changes in fertility are being accounted for. We summarize the
findings of this comparative static exercise in the following remark.
Remark 3.4. Through capital accumulation and the larger number of scientists and work-
ers, life expectancy induces economic growth. The positive effects of higher savings and
higher labor force participation outweigh the negative one of lower fertility.
In principle, there are further potential effects that could be considered in future works.
Just to mention a few, including doctors and nurses as a third type of human capital
would impose an additional negative effect of life expectancy on economic development
since longer lives would reduce the share of human capital available for production and
R&D. One potential positive effect that has been abstracted from in this analysis is
the income-dependent quantity-quality trade-off. Incorporating longevity- or income-
determined education as in de la Croix and Licandro (1999) and Strulik et al. (2013)
would weaken the negative fertility effects and could, potentially, even outweigh them.
So far, the average U.S. health share of 11.4% between 1960–2017 has been used in
the analysis. To gain additional insights into the relationship between life expectancy
and economic development, in Figure 3.7 we investigate the maximum attainable 2017
life expectancy and level of p.c. output for τ ∈ [0, 1].
As expected, we find a hump-shaped relationship. Also, for τ = 0 and τ = 1 zero
production takes place. For zero health investments, the survival probability and the
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Figure 3.7: p.c. output and life expectancy for τ ∈ [0, 1] (p.c. output: dashed blue line;
life expectancy: dotted red line)
saving rate are zero and, thus, the capital stock and production are zero, too. For small
health shares, the gains in output as well as in life expectancy are large. According to our
model, a maximum output of ymax = 3.08 can be reached with a tax rate of τ = 0.271.
This corresponds to a life expectancy of 88.6 years. For larger health shares, there is a
steep decline in output. The logic behind is that, at some point, the positive effects of
increasing longevity are outweighed by the resource demand of health care. Interestingly,
life expectancy continues to increase way beyond the growth maximizing tax rate. For
τ = 0.734, a maximum life expectancy of 92.9 years can be reached. The trade-off in
terms of economic development is, however, huge. Compared to the growth-maximizing
size of the health care sector, an additional 3.85 years of life expectancy come at the cost
of reducing p.c. output by 38.2%.
Remark 3.5. Increasing the health share beyond its growth-maximizing size comes at the
cost of a steep decline in p.c. output, while the additional gains in life expectancy are
rather small.
Our results also contribute to the discussion surrounding rising health shares and the
consequent effects on economic development. Given that the average OECD health share
has increased from 9.3% to 12.6% over the period 2000–2017 (World Bank, 2019), we can,
at least, be guardedly optimistic that this increase in absolute and relative health expendi-
tures did not only extend individual’s lives but also fostered economic growth. This result
contrasts Kuhn and Prettner (2016) who include health care personnel and find a smaller
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optimal size of the health sector of 8.61% along the BGP. Since in our framework, the
optimal health share decreases over time and remembering that we abstract from human
capital employed in health care, a larger optimal size of the health sector is corollary.
Turning to the welfare effects of longevity-driven economic growth, Kuhn and Prettner
(2016) conduct an analysis on the trade-off between life and growth and find that it can
be optimal to increase the size of the health care sector beyond its growth-maximizing
size. In principle, our results do not rule out this conclusion, nonetheless, a thorough
analysis including more generations would be necessary to properly assess the welfare
effects within our framework.
3.6 Conclusions
We introduce an endogenous survival probability into a growth framework driven by
purposeful R&D. The frequency at which new ideas are developed increases in the level of
aggregate savings and in the number of scientists employed. Higher savings imply higher
operating profits since more machines can be produced. This raises the demand for and,
thus, the wage rate of scientists, resulting in higher R&D employment and faster economic
progress.
Life expectancy increases in the public resources devoted toward health, which, in
turn, raises the incentives to save and to work more, while it induces a negative effect on
the fertility decision. We disentangle the separate channels and are able to show that,
overall, life expectancy exerts positive growth effects. The reduction in the size of the labor
force over time is overcompensated by higher labor force participation and, especially, by
higher savings and investments. Additionally, we show that the growth-maximizing size
of the health care sector is way smaller than the size that would maximize life expectancy.
Given that within the OECD, the average share of the health care sector is substantially
smaller than our growth-maximizing size, devoting further resources toward health care
might not only increase life expectancy but also foster economic development.
Our model approach allows for several interesting extensions. We abrogate from
income-dependent education, which would, most likely, spur longevity-induced growth
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effects. Also, including human capital employed in health care might provide additional
interesting insights, as increases in life expectancy would draw away labor from produc-
tion and R&D and exert a potential negative effect on economic growth. Related to that,
dividing the health sector into health care personnel and medical researchers could be a
promising avenue for future research because it would allow for a more realistic modeling
of aging.
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CHAPTER 4
The Scientific Revolution and Its Role in the Transition to
Sustained Economic Growth∗
∗This chapter is joint work with Klaus Prettner.
Abstract
We propose a Unified Growth model that analyzes the role of the Scientific Revolution in
the takeoff to modern economic growth. Basic scientific knowledge is a necessary input
in the production of applied knowledge, which, in turn, fuels productivity growth and
leads to rising incomes. Eventually, rising incomes instigate a fertility transition and a
takeoff of educational investments and human capital accumulation. In regions where
scientific inquiry is severely constrained (for religious reasons or because of oppressive
rulers), the takeoff to modern growth is delayed or might even not occur at all. The novel
mechanism that we propose for the latent transition towards a takeoff could contribute
to our understanding of why sustained growth emerged first in Europe.
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4.1 Introduction
Though the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist afterward works
in a different world.
(Thomas S. Kuhn, 1970)
The introductory quote of famous twentieth century historian and philosopher Thomas
Kuhn, who established the notion of the Scientific Revolution, could be transferred easily
to popular works of modern growth economics. In these R&D-based models of economic
growth as pioneered by Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Jones (1995)1,
scientists build upon the existing stock of knowledge such that inventions made in the
past facilitate the future R&D-process. Of course, the historical period of the Scientific
Revolution that paved the way for the Age of Enlightenment and for subsequent social
and economic progress has a much broader interpretation. It comprises not only the
stock of past knowledge that facilitates future research such as Isaac Newton’s laws of
motion, the law of universal gravitation, and the subsequent research on vacuums in the
seventeenth century, but also the paradigm shifts in the foundations of scientific inquiry
(the scientific method), and changes in the possibilities to disseminate knowledge. For
example, the “Republic of Letters”, a group of scientists and intellectuals who discussed
and shared ideas intensively changed the way of knowledge dissemination and finally led
to the establishment of the first journals.
The deepening of knowledge how nature works, the emergence of the scientific method,
and the faster dissemination of ideas that are all rooted in the Scientific Revolution
inspired tinkerers and engineers over the next centuries to build upon this knowledge
base in moving the technological frontier forward (Mokyr, 2016). Without the knowledge
on motion and vacuums, without painstakingly experimenting, and without the possibility
to share ideas, the steam engine might not have been developed and improved by Denis
Papin, Thomas Savery, Thomas Newcomen, and James Watt (Rosen, 2010).
1For a non-exhaustive list of contributions in endogenous, semi-endogenous, and Schumpeterian
growth theory, see, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1991), Kortum (1997), Dinopoulos and Thomp-
son (1998), Peretto (1998), Segerstro¨m (1998), Young (1998), Howitt (1999), Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001),
Strulik (2005), Bucci (2008), Peretto and Saeter (2013), Strulik et al. (2013), and Prettner (2014).
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The Unified Growth Theory as developed in the seminal works of Galor and Weil
(2000) and Galor (2005, 2011)2, led to a better understanding among economists on the
mechanisms that triggered the escape from the Malthusian trap, resulting in the Industrial
Revolution and in the takeoff toward sustained modern economic growth. This strand of
literature usually emphasizes the quality-quantity tradeoff that affects the size and the
education of the labor force and, with it, the rate at which new ideas are developed. What
these models do not consider is the above explained scientific basis that is necessary for
productive applied R&D to take place. Prettner and Werner (2016) include a basic scien-
tific research sector into an endogenous growth framework of the Jones (1995) type and
analyze the extent to which basic research influences modern economic growth. However,
Prettner and Werner (2016) do not focus on the interactions between basic scientific re-
search and applied research over the very long run and how these interactions facilitate a
takeoff toward the phase of sustained economic growth.
We aim at contributing to the literature by analyzing the extent to which the Scientific
Revolution could have influenced the following escape from Malthusian stagnation. We
do this by merging the two strands of Unified Growth Theory and R&D-based endoge-
nous growth theory that includes both basic scientific knowledge and applied patentable
knowledge. As is standard in the Unified Growth literature, the model features utility-
maximizing households with a quality-quantity tradeoff regarding the number of children
and their education. An increase of income over time leads the economy up to a point at
which investments in education become positive and and a fertility transition sets in (see,
for example, Strulik et al., 2013). The associated increase in human capital accumulation
is then one of the central divers of the takeoff toward sustained economic growth.
In contrast to the standard Unified Growth literature, however, there is an additional
engine for the takeoff toward sustained economic growth that provides the basis for for the
rise in the income level that leads to the fertility transition in the first place. This second
driving force is represented by the evolution of the stock of basic scientific knowledge,
2Other prominent contributions include the works of Jones (2001), Ko¨gel and Prskawetz (2001),
Hansen and Prescott (2002), Galor and Moav (2002, 2004, 2006), Doepke (2004), Cervellati and Sunde
(2005, 2011), Strulik and Weisdorf (2008), and Strulik et al. (2013).
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which is a necessary input in the production of applied knowledge in a purposeful R&D
sector along the lines of Romer (1990) and Jones (1995). Applied R&D only becomes
profitable and operative once a large enough stock of basic scientific knowledge in a
society exists. Only then does the applied research sector start to produce the patents
that are needed in the intermediate goods sector to produce the differentiated machines
that are, in turn, required in the final goods sector to produce the consumption aggregate.
This structure of the model makes clear that the takeoff of applied R&D is a central
driver of long-run economic development that enables the fertility transition later on. The
increase in applied R&D, however, cannot occur if there is no basic scientific knowledge
base in the economy. This mechanism is our proposed formal modeling of the contribution
of the Scientific Revolution as a major trigger of the later Industrial Revolution and the
takeoff to modern economic growth as described by Wootton (2015) and Mokyr (2016).
We believe that the suggested novel approach enables a more sophisticated understanding
of the growth process over the very long run and of the economic importance of the
interaction between the basic scientific knowledge stock of a society and the accumulation
of applied knowledge in the transition from stagnation to sustained long-run economic
progress.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce the basic model as-
sumptions, the structure of the household side, and the properties of the production side
of the economy. In Section 4.3, we derive the balanced growth path analytically. In Sec-
tion 4.4, we present the model simulation and discuss comparative statics with regards
to the timing of the Scientific Revolution and its effect on the timing of the Industrial
Revolution. Finally, in Section 4.5, we summarize our findings and provide suggestions
for future research.
4.2 The model
In this section we describe the basic knowledge-driven growth framework in the vein
of Romer (1990) and Jones (1995) into which we incorporate an endogenous fertility-
education decision along the lines of Becker and Lewis (1973), Galor and Weil (2000), and
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Strulik et al. (2013) and a basic science sector in which the laws of nature are deciphered
and the foundations for applied knowledge are laid along the lines of Prettner and Werner
(2016).
4.2.1 Basic assumptions
Consider a small open economy that is populated by three overlapping generations: chil-
dren, adults, and retirees. Children receive consumption from their parents and retirees
consume out of their savings accumulated in adulthood. At the end of old-age, individuals
die with certainty.3 Adults are modeled as single-sex parents4 and make all economically
relevant decisions on i) consumption during adulthood and old-age, ii) the number of their
children, and iii) the education investments in each child. The resulting consumption-
saving decision impacts on intermediate goods production and thereby on the incentives
to develop new blueprints in applied R&D. A necessary input in applied R&D is at least
a basic knowledge of the laws of nature, on scientific inquiry, and on the way to dissem-
inate insights. This knowledge is generated in a basic scientific sector by thinkers who
decipher how nature works. The better a society’s understanding of the laws of nature,
of scientific inquiry, and of knowledge dissemination are, the more productive is applied
R&D. Since applied R&D is one of the main drivers of long-run economic growth, basic
scientific knowledge acts as a catalyst of the takeoff to sustained economic growth.
The fertility decision of adults determines the evolution of the population size, whereas
the education decision determines individual human capital accumulation. There is a
quality-quantity tradeoff of parents in the sense that they can increase the number of
their children but at the expense of lower investments in the education of each child (and
vice versa). For low levels of economic development, education investments are a luxury
good and parents find it optimal to choose the corner solution of no education investments
3For simplicity, we abstract from pension schemes and from a changing life expectancy because pension
schemes are rather a 20th century development (Boersch-Supan and Wilke, 2004) and the implementation
of endogenous life expectancy would complicate the model without altering the central results (for a
Unified Growth Model that takes changing mortality into account, see Cervellati and Sunde, 2005).
4The assumption of single-sex adults is made to abstract from modeling intra-family bargaining
processes, which allows us to focus on the macroeconomic effects. For contributions that investigate the
intra-household decision process in more detail see, for example, de la Croix and Vander Donckt (2010),
Bloom et al. (2015), Prettner and Strulik (2017), and Doepke and Kindermann (2019).
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and high fertility. Once income surpasses a certain threshold, investments in education
of children sets in, which triggers a quality-quantity substitution of increasing education
investments and falling fertility. As in standard Unified Growth Models, this is another
main engine for the takeoff to sustained economic growth.
4.2.2 Consumption side
Individuals derive utility from consumption during adulthood, ct, from consumption dur-
ing retirement, ct+1 = st(1 + r¯), where st are savings and r¯ is the rate of return, from
having children, nt, and from the education investments in their children, et. For sim-
plicity, we assume a small open economy such that the capital rental rate is determined
on the world market. Utility is logarithmic and determined according to the following
function
ut = log(ct) + β log[st · (1 + r¯)] + ξ log(nt) + θ log(et + e¯), (4.1)
where β refers to individual impatience5, ξ represents the preferences of parents for the
number of children, and θ are the preferences of parents for children’s education. The
parameter e¯ represents a minimum informal education level that children acquire through
observation and learning-by-doing even if parents do not invest in the education of their
children at all (see Strulik et al., 2013). This parameter ensures that education is a
luxury good and it does not pay off for poor societies to invest in formal education.
This formulation captures the situation in agrarian pre-industrial societies well in which
children mainly learned by working alongside their parents and peers on the fields.
The lifetime budget constraint is given by
(1− ψnt)wtht = ct + st + ηetnt, (4.2)
where wt is the wage rate per unit of human capital, ht. The price of a unit of education
5The parameter β induces a similar individual behavior as a probability to die between adulthood
and old age. Thus, a small β can also be interpreted as having a relatively short retirement phase, which
fits most of human history (Chakraborty, 2004; Baldanzi et al., 2019b).
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is given by η, whereas ψ denotes the fraction of parental time that each child requires to
be raised (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2005, 2011). The product wtht is labor income
per worker for a given level of individual human capital and 1− ψnt represents the labor
force participation rate. Individuals save st of their wage income for old-age consumption.
The reminder is spent on consumption during adulthood, ct, and on children’s education,
ηetnt. Expenditures on education depend, in turn, on the cost of each unit of education,
η, the quantity of education, et, and the number of children, nt. Overall, this setting
implies a quality-quantity tradeoff: on the one hand, more children increase utility; on
the other hand, more children decrease the amount of resources that can be devoted to
the education of each child. This decrease in education per child has then a negative
effect on utility.6
Maximizing (4.1) subject to (4.2) yields the following optimality conditions for con-
sumption, savings, fertility, and education
ct =
wtht
1 + β + ξ
, nt =
(ξ − θ)wtht
(1 + β + ξ)(ψwtht − ηe¯) ,
et =
θψwtht − ξηe¯
η(ξ − θ) , st =
βwtht
1 + β + ξ
.
We observe that consumption and savings increase with income, while consumption de-
creases with the discount factor and savings increase with the discount factor. In addition,
we observe that fertility stays constant in the long-run limit even for rising income, which
is in line with the literature (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2005, 2011; Strulik et al., 2013).
For fertility to be positive, ξ > θ and wtht > ηe¯/ψ have to hold. These parameter restric-
tions are reasonable because they rule out the situation in which parents would want to
invest in the education of their children before choosing to have children at all and they
ensure a minimum level of income that is needed for positive fertility (i.e., to ensure that
the population does not become extinct in the next generation). Education investments
6If, instead, the costs of fertility were given by a fixed amount of resources, fertility would increase
perpetually with rising income, which is counterfactual. Since, in this case, education would also rise
with income, the quality-quantity tradeoff vanished.
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cannot be negative such that the possibility of a corner solution exists
et =

0 for wtht < ξηe¯/θψ
θψwtht−ξηe¯
η(ξ−θ) otherwise.
Altogether, parents only invest in the education of their children after the wage income
has surpassed the given threshold ξηe¯/θψ.
4.2.3 Human capital
Children’s education determines the next generation’s level of human capital when the
children of the previous period become adults and supply their time on the labor market.
To derive adult’s human capital, we set the parental expenditures on education equal to
the costs of education (the salaries of teachers) and isolate the implied employment level of
teaching personnel. Aggregate educational expenditures of parents are given by ηetntLt,
where Lt is the number of workers/households in period t. Educational expenditures are
thus education expenditures per child (η · et), multiplied by the number of children (nt),
and aggregated over all households that invest in education (Lt). The costs of education
are the wages of teachers given by HEt wt, with H
E
t being the aggregate human capital
employed in education. Equating educational expenditures with educational costs and
solving for human capital employment in the schooling sector yields
HEt =
ηetntLt
wt
.
Assuming that the human capital of the next generation depends on the educational
resources invested in each child and denoting the productivity of teachers by µ, individual
human capital at time t+ 1 can be derived as
ht+1 =
µHEt
Lt+1
+ e¯.
In this expression, µHEt describes the economy-wide offered schooling. Dividing the
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economy-wide offered schooling by the number of pupils in period t (i.e., the number
of adults in period t + 1), yields the educational resources devoted to each child, which
represents the quality of schooling. In case of a low parental income, education expendi-
tures are zero and no teachers will be employed in the economy. Pupils would then solely
learn by observing their parents and peers such that individual human capital stayed
equal to the costless informal education that each child obtains, e¯.
4.2.4 Production side
There are four sectors, the final goods sector, the intermediate goods sector, the applied
R&D sector, and the basic scientific research sector. The aggregate final good is pro-
duced under perfect competition using workers and an intermediate good as input. The
intermediate good, in turn, is produced under Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic com-
petition using one unit of final output to produce one unit of the intermediate good, xt
(cf. Aghion and Howitt, 2009). For the monopolist to produce the intermediate good, a
blueprint needs to be bought from the applied research sector. The necessary funds are
collected by issuing shares that can be purchased using household’s savings. For simplic-
ity, we abstract from physical capital in the production process. Its inclusion would not
alter our main findings but it would complicate the model substantially (see also Galor
and Weil, 2000).
The accumulation of applied knowledge (in the form of patents/blueprints) follows
Romer (1990) and Jones (1995) after the takeoff to modern economic growth occurred.
Applied knowledge is produced in a purposeful R&D sector in which profit-driven firms
invest in the creation of the new patents/blueprints to derive a stream of profits from
the associated monopolistic competition. This setting is augmented by a basic scientific
sector as in Prettner and Werner (2016), in which the laws of nature are deciphered and
the methods of scientific inquiry are invented. The stock of accumulated knowledge in
this sector provides the basis for applied research. Since the laws of nature and the way
of performing science cannot be patented, the output of this sector is non-excludable such
that this sector is not profit-driven. In addition, the ideas that are generated in this sector
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are non-rival such that its use by one researcher in applied research does not impinge on
the productivity of the idea when other applied researchers are using them.
We conceptualize the non-excludability of the results of scientific inquiry in the sense
that great minds are either i) intrinsically motivated to think about how nature works
or ii) that they do it because it might raise a thinker’s reputation among her peers. In
modern times, basic research is typically funded by governments and conducted in research
institutes and universities.7 Since we do not want to overburden our model, we abstract
from the public financing of modern basic science and focus on the potential way how
basic scientific discoveries could historically have occurred and contributed to the takeoff
to modern knowledge-based economic growth. The underlying assumption is that the
number of eureka moments increases with the size of the population (Kremer, 1993) and
with its education level (Strulik et al., 2013). Scientists might also form societies/journals
to disseminate their thoughts and ideas such that the knowledge they create diffuses to
other parts of the society and can be used by the scientists in the applied research sector to
create new patents/blueprints (Mokyr, 2002, 2005, 2016; Wootton, 2015). More generally,
the output that this sector produces could be thought to comprise everything that makes
it easier to discover new technologies and accumulate more basic and applied knowledge.
In that sense the output of the basic scientific sector can be interpreted as an important
part of the Culture of Growth (Mokyr, 2016) that is necessary for a society to engage in
the creation of new ideas and thereby to foster progress (Wootton, 2015).
The aggregate final good is produced according to the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion
Yt = (H
Y
t )
1−α
At∑
i=1
(xit)
α,
where HY is human capital employed in final goods production (i.e., the stock of knowl-
edge of workers in the final goods sector), xi is the amount of intermediate good i used in
production, α ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of final output with respect to the employment of
7For the modeling of a modern basic research sector along these lines, see, for example, Gersbach
et al. (2012), Gersbach and Schneider (2015), Akcigit et al. (2013), Prettner and Werner (2016), and
Gersbach et al. (2018).
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intermediate goods, and At refers to the stock of blueprints available in period t. Thus,
there are At different intermediate goods used in the production of the final good.
Perfect competition ensures that all production factors are paid their marginal value
products. The wage per unit of human capital of final goods producers and the price of
intermediate good i are therefore given by
wYt = (1− α)
Yt
HYt
,
pY,it = α
(
HYt
)1−α (
xit
)α−1
.
Using the second expression, the profit function in the intermediate goods sector i becomes
pix,it = p
Y,i
t x
i
t − xit.
Because the intermediate goods producer utilizes a one-for-one technology, the costs of
production are equal to the amount of final output employed in the production process.
Profit maximization then leads to the optimal pricing rule
pit =
1
α
.
In the standard Romer (1990) framework, the price of intermediate good i additionally
depends on the capital rental rate. Since we abstract from any sort of physical capital
in our model economy, the capital rental rate drops out. The mark-up of the monopolist
only depends on the elasticity of final output with respect to intermediates. An immediate
implication is that all intermediate goods producers charge the same mark-up over the
price that obtains in a perfectly competitive market such that prices do not depend on
the machine variety i anymore. The total quantity of intermediate goods produced can
then be expressed as
xt = H
Y
t α
2
1−α .
Aggregate output, operating profits in the intermediate goods sector, and the wage rate
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per unit of human capital in the final goods sector thus simplify to
Yt = AtH
Y
t α
2α
1−α ,
pixt =
1− α
α
α
2
1−αHYt ,
wYt = (1− α)Atα
2α
1−α .
The applied research sector follows Prettner and Werner (2016). The stock of patents
increases according to the production function
At+1 − At = δAχt Bσt HAt .
As in Romer (1990) and Jones (1995), the development of new ideas depends on the stock
of already existing ideas, At, on the amount of human capital employed in applied research,
HAt , and on the productivity of scientists in this sector, δ. To analyze the effect of the
Scientific Revolution, we also include basic scientific knowledge, Bt, as a necessary input
for applied knowledge production. In this setting, χ measures the extent of intertemporal
knowledge spillovers (standing on shoulders externality) in the production of applied
knowledge, while σ measures the extent of intersectoral knowledge spillovers from basic
scientific knowledge to applied research. To focus on a meaningful economic solution,
human capital employed in R&D (HAt ) needs to be non-negative. Thus, the stock of ideas
cannot decrease over time.
Already from this formulation, the importance of the Scientific Revolution for the
Industrial Revolution becomes obvious. Overall productivity of applied research is given
by δAχt B
σ
t , which determines the profitability of this sector and the amount of labor that
it employs. Without any knowledge of the laws of nature, or, for that matter, with a
culture that does not foster scientific inquiry, applied scientists are unproductive and
new blueprints/patents cannot be discovered. As a consequence, no applied scientists are
employed by firms, which reduces the frequency at which new ideas are developed to zero.
This approximates, from a formal perspective, the historical state of economies before the
Scientific Revolution (Wootton, 2015). Nature is still arcane and profit-driven R&D is
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non-existent.
Once this state is overcome and a positive stock of basic scientific knowledge exists,
applied knowledge production becomes feasible. In more recent times, applied R&D firms
maximize their profits
piAt = p
A
t δA
χ
t B
σ
t H
A
t − wAt HAt ,
where the first term on the right-hand side is the revenue of selling ideas at the price pAt
and the second term is the cost of employing human capital HAt , which is the wage w
A
t per
unit of human capital employment. Maximizing profits with respect to the employment
of applied scientists, HAt , yields the following relation between wages in applied research
and effective productivity in the applied research sector
wAt = p
A
t δA
χ
t B
σ
t .
Clearly, if applied R&D firms can charge higher prices, pAt , for the blueprints that they sell,
the wages of applied scientists are higher such that this sector could attract more employ-
ment and, thus, produce more ideas. If scientists were more productive (δ were higher),
a similar argument held true and employment of applied scientists and thereby techno-
logical progress would be faster. Finally, a greater stock of basic scientific knowledge, Bt,
also fosters applied research productivity and leads to faster technological progress and
faster economic growth.
As argued above, if Bt = 0 holds, then the wages of applied scientists were zero and
no technological progress would take place. As the stock of basic scientific knowledge
increases, (Bt−Bt−1 > 0), the productivity of applied knowledge creation rises gradually,
such that wages and employment of applied scientists also rise. This, in turn, fosters
technological progress and economic growth and catalyzes a takeoff toward sustained
knowledge-driven economic development.
Labor market clearing implies that the wage rates of workers in the final goods sector
and those of scientists in the applied research sector have to equalize. Considering that
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prices of patents, pAt , are paid for by discounted operating profits, pi
x
t /(1 + r¯), the amount
of human capital employed in final goods production can be expressed as
HYt =
(1 + r¯)A1−χt
αδBσt
.
Given that human capital is employed in production, education and R&D, HAt can be
derived as
HAt = (1− ψnt)Ht −HYt −HEt .
Turning to the basic scientific research sector, the knowledge base increases according to
the production function
Bt+1 −Bt = κHλt ,
where, unlike in the applied research sector, deciphering the laws of nature is not com-
pensated.8 We follow Kremer (1993) and Strulik et al. (2013) in the assumption that the
discovery of new basic scientific knowledge depends on the overall number of thinkers in
the economy and on their education, i.e., on the stock of aggregate human capital. We
also include a stepping-on-toes externality as represented by the inverse of λ, to account
for potential duplication of research effort as in Jones (1995). Finally, κ is the research
productivity in the basic science sector. A situation in which κ = 0 could be interpreted as
capturing a society in which religion or oppressive institutional settings prevent scientific
inquiry. Thus, in the words of Mokyr (2016), the “Culture of Growth” would be absent.
Putting all the information together, we arrive at the following system of equations
8As argued above, introducing compensation of basic scientific knowledge creation via public funding
and taxes is possible but it complicates the model substantially without leading to new insights. For the
workings of the model for a modern economy in which basic scientific knowledge is created in publicly
funded universities and research facilities see Prettner and Werner (2016). However, these authors fully
abstract from the takeoff to modern economic growth, the Scientific Revolution, and a Unified Growth
setting.
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that fully describes the evolution of our model economy over time
At+1 = At + δA
χ
t B
σ
t H
A
t , (4.3)
Bt+1 = Bt + κH
λ
t , (4.4)
ht+1 =
µHEt
nt
+ e¯, (4.5)
nt+1 =
(ξ − θ)wt+1ht+1
(1 + β + ξ)(ψwt+1ht+1 − ηe¯) , (4.6)
Lt+1 = ntLt, (4.7)
wt+1 = (1− α)At+1α 2α1−α , (4.8)
HYt+1 =
(1 + r¯)A1−χt+1
αδBσt+1
, (4.9)
HEt+1 =
ηLt+1nt+1
wt+1
θψwt+1ht+1 − ξηe¯
η(ξ − θ) , (4.10)
HAt+1 = (1− ψnt+1)ht+1Lt+1 −HYt+1 −HEt+1, (4.11)
Here, Equation (4.3) refers to the equilibrium evolution of the stock of applied knowledge
that is needed for the production of differentiated intermediate goods that are, in turn,
used in the production of the final output. Equation (4.4) refers to the evolution of
the stock of basic scientific knowledge that is an essential input in the production of
applied knowledge and lays the foundation for a takeoff toward modern knowledge-based
economic growth. Equation (4.5) describes the evolution of individual human capital
depending on the knowledge that children acquire by observing their parents and peers
and by the purposeful education investments of parents. The latter only become positive
once an economy has surpassed a certain income threshold, facilitating the takeoff toward
sustained economic growth. Equation (4.6) refers to the fertility choice of households
that determines population growth. In line with empirical observations, fertility decreases
after a certain stage of economic development is reached and then converges to a lower
but positive level. Equation (4.7) captures the evolution of the workforce. Equation (4.8)
delivers the wage rate per unit of human capital that increases with the stock of applied
knowledge in the economy. Finally, Equations (4.9)–(4.11) express employment of human
capital in final goods production, education, and R&D, respectively.
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In the next section, we use this system to derive the balanced growth path (BGP)
analytically. Afterwards, we solve the model numerically to analyze the extent to which
basic scientific knowledge drives the takeoff toward sustained long-run growth.
4.3 Balanced growth path
Along the BGP, the growth rates of all variables and the employment shares remain
constant. In the following, we denote the growth rate of a variable x between periods t
and t+ 1 by gx,t = (xt+1 − xt)/xt.
We observe that positive growth implies ever rising incomes (limt→∞wtht =∞), such
that fertility and educational investments along the BGP are equal to
n =
ξ − θ
(1 + β + ξ)ψ
, (4.12)
et =
θψwtht
η(ξ − θ) . (4.13)
Along the BGP, fertility is constant and education is growing with wt · ht. Considering
that consumption, ct, and savings, st, also grow with wt · ht, the BGP growth rates of
individual human capital and of the wage rate need to be determined. Evolution of
individual human capital follows the equation
ht+1 =
µηetntLt
wtLt+1
+ e¯.
Substituting et from Equation (4.13) and using that Lt+1/Lt = nt, we arrive at
ht+1 =
µθψht
ξ − θ + e¯. (4.14)
Along the BGP, e¯ becomes negligibly small compared with formal schooling as represented
by the first term in Equation (4.14). Therefore, the BGP growth rate of individual human
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capital can be expressed as
gh =
µθψ
ξ − θ − 1. (4.15)
Wage growth solely depends on growth in productive ideas as we know from Equation
(4.8). We therefore turn towards examining the growth rate of At in the next step. From
Equation (4.3) we get
gA,t =
δBσt H
A
t
A1−χt
. (4.16)
By definition, the growth rate of A must be constant along the BGP, i.e., we have that
gA,t = gA,t+1 holds for all t. This occurs if
gA,t =
(
Bt+1
Bt
) σ
1−χ
(
HAt+1
HAt
) 1
1−χ
− 1, (4.17)
is fulfilled such that the numerator and the denominator of Equation (4.16) grow at the
same rate. In addition, also the growth rate of B must be constant, i.e., we must have
gB,t = gB,t+1, which holds for
Bt+1
Bt
=
(
Ht+1
Ht
)λ
. (4.18)
Next, we derive the expression Ht+1/Ht in Equation (4.18) by substituting in the
expressions for aggregate human capital such that
Ht+1
Ht
=
Lt+1ht+1
Ltht
. (4.19)
Using that fertility is constant along the BGP and taking advantage of Equation (4.15),
Equation (4.19) can be rewritten as
Ht+1
Ht
= n
µθψ
ξ − θ . (4.20)
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Inserting Equation (4.20) into Equation (4.18), the growth factor of scientific knowledge
along the BGP becomes
Bt+1
Bt
=
(
n
µθψ
ξ − θ
)λ
. (4.21)
Finally, the BGP expression for HAt+1/H
A
t has to be determined. Along the BGP, the
share of human capital employed in applied research is constant. Therefore, gHA = gH
has to hold, which implies
HAt+1
HAt
=
Ht+1
Ht
. (4.22)
Using equations (4.20), (4.21), and (4.22) in Equation (4.17), the growth rate of applied
knowledge along the BGP follows as
gA =
(
n
µθψ
ξ − θ
) 1+λσ
1−χ
− 1.
Substituting in the fertility rate from Equation (4.12), we arrive at the following expression
for the long run BGP growth rate in the modern growth regime
gA =
(
θµ
1 + β + ξ
) 1+λσ
1−χ
− 1. (4.23)
In the expression for the long-run growth rate, Equation (4.23), household behavior
is represented by the term in brackets and mainly relates to the choice of having more
children versus educating them well. From this expression, a number of intuitive results
that are in line with the standard literature (cf. Strulik et al., 2013; Prettner and Werner,
2016; Baldanzi et al., 2019a) follow. The preference parameter for education, θ, raises in-
dividual human capital accumulation of the next generation and reduces fertility, whereas
the reverse holds true for the preference parameter for the number of children, ξ. In line
with Strulik et al. (2013), the negative effect of decreasing fertility on aggregate human
capital accumulation is overcompensated by the positive effect of accumulating human
capital faster. The reason is that a decline in fertility sets free additional resources via
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the budget constraint that can be used to invest in education. Thus, economic growth
increases with θ and decreases with ξ. There is an additional positive effect represented
by µ, which is the productivity of teachers. If teachers are more productive, then, for a
given investment in education, human capital accumulates faster. This does not affect
fertility and only raises human capital accumulation. Thus, technological progress and
income growth increase. We summarize these effects in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1.
i) An increase in education investments and a decline in fertility, as triggered by an
increase in the parameter θ or a decrease in the parameter ξ, unambiguously raise
long-run economic growth because the positive effects of greater education invest-
ments on aggregate human capital accumulation outweigh the negative effects of
lower fertility.
ii) An increase in teaching productivity, µ, unambiguously raises long-run economic
growth.
On top of these results, the long-run growth rate increases with the standing on
shoulders effect, λ, because it determines the rate at which basic scientific knowledge
accumulates. The long-run growth rate also increases with the intersectoral knowledge
spillovers, σ, because they increase the importance of basic scientific knowledge in the
production of new patents. Both of these effects increase the productivity of human
capital employed in applied research and thereby raise the rate at which new patents are
developed. This, in turn, raises final goods production and income growth. We summarize
these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. For χ < 1, long-run economic growth increases unambiguously with
faster accumulation of basic scientific knowledge as represented by the terms λ and σ.
Thus, basic scientific knowledge is an important driver of economic prosperity.
This proposition shows the importance of basic scientific knowledge for long-run eco-
nomic growth in the modern regime. Irrespective of the assumption χ < 1, which usually
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implies that long-run growth is only a function of the parameters that determine pop-
ulation growth and education (as in Jones, 1995), our result shows that basic scientific
knowledge accumulation and human capital accumulation attain crucial roles in deter-
mining economic prosperity.
4.4 Simulation
4.4.1 Data
The simulation resembles developments of total factor productivity (TFP), basic scientific
knowledge, wage income, the net fertility rate, and individual human capital. Our aim
is to use long term data from the United Kingdom that reach back before the Industrial
Revolution. We choose the UK as a reference because it is an important forerunner in
both the Scientific Revolution and the Industrial Revolution (Galor, 2005, 2011; Wootton,
2015; Mokyr, 2016). In addition, the data coverage and the data quality for the UK tends
to better over such a long time horizon than for other countries.
We take the data on TFP from FRED (2017) that contains annual TFP growth rates
from 1761 onward. Using 25-years averages to eliminate business-cycle fluctuations, we
derive the change in the level of TFP over time. We approximate basic scientific knowledge
by means of the annual number of cited references (Ware and Mabe, 2015) with data from
1651 onward. As explained in Section 4.2.4, basic scientific knowledge is useful for applied
research without, however, being patentable, i.e., it is non-rival and non-excludable. We
are well aware of the fact that the number of citations is only a crude indicator for scientific
activity but it is the best that we have at our disposal. In addition, more citations would
surely imply a higher rate of knowledge diffusion and, thus, indicate a higher use of basic
scientific research in applied research.
Since we abstract from physical capital in the production process, a direct indicator
for economic development in terms of income growth is the wage per worker. As a proxy
for this wage rate in the UK, we refer to the real wage of UK craftsmen during 1700–
2000 reported by Clark (2005). Given that the majority of the population was low-skilled
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historically, this is arguably an acceptable proxy.
In our model, fertility is the number of children per unisex adult. Choosing fertility
in the UK as a comparison would be misleading because of high rates of child mortality,
especially before the twentieth century (see Doepke, 2005). We therefore combine the
data set of Ajus and Lindgre (2015) on fertility rates in the UK with the data set of
Johansson et al. (2015) on child mortality in the UK to calculate the net reproduction
rate. The resulting time series on the net reproduction rate per woman is then equal to
the unisex net fertility rate as used in our model and it covers the period 1800-2000.
Finally, education and with it individual human capital is one of the main driving
forces of the transition to sustained economic growth. Thus, our simulation should match
the corresponding data. We therefore use the time series on mean years of schooling in
the UK from Madsen and Murtin (2017) and apply a Mincer equation as in Prettner et al.
(2013) and Hall and Jones (1999) to transform the education data from 1700–2000 into
units of human capital.
4.4.2 Simulation results
For our simulation we have data covering up to 300 years. We choose the following
parameter values and initial conditions to match these data. The elasticity of final output
with respect to intermediates is set to α = 0.3, which is in line with the literature (Jones,
1995; Acemoglu, 2009). Similar to Strulik et al. (2013), the time costs for raising one
child are 8%, i.e., ψ = 0.08. The yearly individual discount rate is approximately 3%,
which corresponds to a discount factor of β = 0.3 over 40 years (Cropper et al., 2014).
All other parameter values are set to fit the data as precisely as possible. In so doing, we
set ξ = 0.35, e¯ = 0.5, θ = 0.23, η = 0.1, δ = 1.15, κ = 0.4, χ = 0.59, µ = 5.4, σ = 0.15,
and λ = 1.9 The initial values for productivity, basic scientific knowledge, and the size of
the workforce are taken as A0 = 10, B0 = 10, and L0 = 1.
Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of TFP over time, with the data (dashed red line) and
the model results (solid blue line) being normalized to unity in 1820. Broadly consistent
9Note that the intertemporal spillovers, χ, are substantially larger than the intersectoral spillovers, σ.
By that we avoid a situation in which basic scientific knowledge is the main driver for economic progress.
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with existing works, TFP is stagnant for decades until the mid-nineteenth century, when
the Industrial Revolution altered production possibilities in a fundamental way (Galor
and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2005, 2011; Mokyr, 2005; Strulik et al., 2013). Not only does our
TFP calibration match the onset of the Industrial Revolution, it also predicts the length
and the magnitude of the takeoff as well as the phase of sustained economic growth from
the twentieth century onward reasonably well.
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of TFP (model prediction: solid blue line; data: dashed red line)
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Figure 4.2: Logarithm of the stock of basic scientific knowledge (model prediction: solid
blue line; data: dashed red line)
Which dynamics pave the way to sustained economic growth? Before the onset of the
Industrial Revolution, wage income is low. Accordingly, educational investments are low,
whereas the fertility rate is high. Productive R&D increases with the stock of existing
blueprints, with the stock of basic scientific knowledge, and with the amount of human
capital devoted to applied research. For early stages of development, productivity and
basic scientific knowledge are small, as is the stock of aggregate human capital. Scientists
in the applied research sector are relatively unproductive, which is why the labor force is
employed in final goods production, leaving productivity stagnant. A growing population
and almost constant education slowly but gradually raise the aggregate stock of human
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capital. Due to decreasing marginal productivity in the final goods sector and a slow
increase in the stock of basic scientific knowledge that comes with the rise in the population
size, productivity of applied researchers increases and becomes high enough for researchers
to be attracted into applied research. This is the time when productivity levels start to
rise slowly at first and at a faster pace later.
Additional insights are obtained from Figure 4.2 by taking a closer look at the role of
basic scientific knowledge in the process towards the takeoff. While the Industrial Revo-
lution and with it productivity growth started around the turn of the nineteenth century
(Ashton, 1997), the takeoff in basic scientific discoveries occurred about one century be-
fore. The increase in the growth rate of citations is stronger in the data than the increase
in the growth rate of basic scientific knowledge in the model. The main reason for that
difference is that in our model all basic scientific discoveries are productive, i.e., they
raise productivity in applied research immediately. However, as we all tend to know only
too well from personal experience, not all scientific research is relevant for applications.
In particular, over time, basic scientific research has broadened. While in the past, the
share of research in the natural sciences was comparatively high, it has decreased as other
disciplines, such as economics, have gained importance. Therefore, over time, the share
of scientific research that is useful for applied research might have decreased, which could
explain the gap between the model predictions and the data.
Wage income is depicted in Figure 4.3 and is also normalized to unity in 1820. The
value derived from the simulation is the available income per worker. As for TFP, we
predict the takeoff approximately right. The income gap that emerges during the twenti-
eth century can be attributed to the presence of skilled workers in the workforce and an
associated increase in the skill premium (Acemoglu, 1998). Since our model incorporates
production workers as well as scientists, one would expect a steeper increase in wages
compared to craftsmen’s wages.
In Figure 4.4, the fertility rate in the model decreases over time and the quantity-
quality trade-off induces an even stronger decrease after the takeoff in income growth.
Comparing the model outcome to UK data, a similar trend can be observed. Importantly,
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of available income (model prediction: solid blue line; data: dashed
red line)
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Figure 4.4: Evolution of fertility (model prediction: solid blue line; data: dashed red line)
the fertility rate is high for low levels of development and it decreases below replacement
fertility at the end of the twentieth century. The main differences between the series
are due to changes in life expectancy over time that our model does not capture. High
mortality rates before the onset of the demographic transition slowed down population
growth in the UK and in the rest of the world (Human Mortality Database, 2019). This
negative pressure on the population size is not present in our model because life expectancy
is assumed to be constant. Therefore, for the pre-industrialization area, the model fertility
rate can be smaller than the fertility rate from the data.
Finally, inspecting Figure 4.5, individual human capital in the data and in the model
increases at the same rate until the Industrial Revolution, after which an increase in the
growth rate in the data can be observed that the model does not match fully. One im-
portant reason is the absence of differential skills, which would induce higher investments
in education of some parts of the population (Acemoglu, 1998). Another reason for the
discrepancy might also be that the data only reflect the quantity of schooling without
controlling for quality, which the model captures.
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Figure 4.5: Individual human capital (model prediction: solid blue line; data: dashed red
line)
4.4.3 Comparative statics
So far, we have shown the importance of the Scientific Revolution for long-run economic
growth from an analytical and numerical perspective. Exploiting the calibrated model,
it is possible to better understand the implications for the timing of the takeoff toward
sustained long-run growth by employing a comparative statics analysis. Changing the
evolution of the stock of basic scientific knowledge, respectively its importance for applied
research, ceteris paribus, we can analyze how a different timing of scientific discoveries
might have altered economic progress and the timing of the takeoff.
In Figure 4.6, we show the evolution of wages given different assumptions on the
productivity of thinkers in the basic scientific research sector. With the exception of κ and
B0 = 10, all parameter values and initial values are as in Section 4.4. The baseline case of
κ = 0.4 is displayed as the red line. By varying κ, basic scientific knowledge accumulates
at a different rate, which, in turn, affects the productivity of scientists working in applied
R&D and, with it, economic progress.
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Figure 4.6: Wages for different values of κ and initial levels of B0
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Overall, the rate of economic growth increases with κ such that the takeoff to long-run
growth is steeper. The logic behind is that more basic scientific knowledge is available,
which makes applied research more profitable. By contrast, the timing of the Industrial
Revolution is postponed with a decrease of κ. In the extreme case of κ = 0, B0 = 10 is
constant over time. In this case, the takeoff is postponed by one generation (as shown
by the yellow line). Since productivity of scientists in the applied research sector is
determined not solely by scientific knowledge but also by education, i.e., human capital,
the economy reaches the threshold at which applied research becomes profitable later.
Eventually, better educated scientists are able to compensate the lack of growth in basic
scientific knowledge and the Industrial Revolution takes its course. While a setback of
one generation might seem little over the course of human history, such a setback would
imply that we had an income level today similar to the one in 1980, which is substantially
less.
Changing the intersectoral spillovers, σ, and keeping everything else constant, also
affects wages and follows a very similar logic. As obvious from Figure 4.7, the timing of
the takeoff crucially hinges on the degree of inclusion of scientific knowledge into applied
knowledge production. For low spillovers, i.e., if scientific advancements are less integrated
into the development of productive R&D (e.g. in case of poor knowledge diffusion or
for cultural reasons), the takeoff in wages occurs later. Again, the reason is that the
application of basic scientific knowledge increases the productivity of applied researchers.
If there is a fast rate of scientific discoveries but these discoveries are not considered in
applied research, the productivity in and profitability of developing new blueprints is low,
which delays the takeoff toward sustained economic growth. These observations directly
lead to the following remark.
Remark 4.1. Basic scientific research and with it the Scientific Revolution play a crucial
role in the timing of the Industrial Revolution. A postponement of the Scientific Revolution
or a weak integration of basic scientific knowledge in applied research would have delayed
economic progress severely.
As discussed in Remark 4.1, growth in basic scientific knowledge is not necessary for
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Figure 4.7: Wages for different values of σ
the economy to take off eventually but it can postpone the takeoff substantially. However,
this is only true for an initially positive stock of scientific knowledge. If gB were zero over
the course of human history, B0 would be zero too. Such a scenario is shown in Figure 4.6
(purple line). The economy would not take off at all because without any understanding
of the natural laws and scientific inquiry, no productive R&D would be possible, leaving
the economy stagnant indefinitely. We emphasize this in the following remark.
Remark 4.2. Scientific knowledge is indispensable for an economy to take off because
productive R&D requires scientists to have, at least, a basic understanding of the laws of
nature and of scientific inquiry.
4.5 Conclusions
We propose a novel Unified Growth model that sheds light on the role of the Scien-
tific Revolution in the process of the convergence toward a takeoff to sustained economic
growth. We show that the accumulation of basic scientific knowledge (comprising knowl-
edge about the laws of nature, knowledge about the scientific method, and knowledge
about the ways to disseminate ideas) and its application in applied research is a crucial
driver of economic progress in the long run. If the stock of scientific knowledge does
not grow or if the application of scientific achievements in applied research is too weak,
the takeoff to sustained economic growth will be delayed. In the extreme case in which
scientific inquiry is prevented altogether, e.g., for religious reasons or by oppressive rulers,
the takeoff to sustained growth might be delayed indefinitely.
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This theory can explain why some countries and regions experienced the fertility tran-
sition and the takeoff to modern economic growth much later than others. For example,
China was technologically more advanced than European countries in the middle ages
but then the Ming Dynasty decided on isolationist policies. Science did not progress as
quickly as previously and China was eventually overtaken by Europe, where the Industrial
Revolution occurred first. In fact, China, which was among the richest countries in the
world around 1000 AD, became one of the poorest countries in the world in the midst of
the twentieth century (Morris, 2010). We believe that our proposed framework can be
helpful in understanding the reasons why this was the case.
As far as promising avenues for further research are concerned, a need exists for better
data on the calibration of the model for the time period 1500 onward. Particularly helpful
would be a database that allowed the quantification of major scientific insights and major
applied knowledge over that time period. Another interesting topic is to analyze the
extent to which institutions and knowledge interacted in the emergence of the Culture of
Growth.
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Demographic change, mainly driven by changing fertility and mortality, has taken
place in all industrialized countries over the past decades and is not expected to slow
down. The individual gains such as longer lifespans and higher education levels are
indisputably positive. However, there exist concerns about the long-run macroeconomic
effects. This dissertation contributes to the debate by extending the literature on the
growth effects of demographic change. The main questions posed in Chapter 1 were
about the fertility and saving effects of changes in the lifetime horizon and the associated
economic implications over the long run. Additionally, the welfare effects of higher life
expectancy were to be analyzed. Chapters 2–4 each contribute to these questions from
a different angle by developing models of endogenous economic growth that incorporate
different demographic structures.
Chapter 2 focuses on the long-run economic growth effects of exogenous changes in
mortality and the consequent welfare implications. Higher survival induces individuals
to save more for retirement. Higher aggregate savings place downward pressure on the
market interest rate and increase the present value of innovations. As a result, employment
in R&D rises, leading to faster innovation and a higher long-run economic growth rate.
The welfare effects of increased life expectancy are disentangled by distinguishing between
longevity-induced utility gains due to higher consumption versus utility gains due to living
longer. It is shown that the direct welfare gains of higher life expectancy, usually, outweigh
the indirect welfare gains of faster economic development.
The model proposed in Chapter 3 provides additional insights into the relationship be-
tween life expectancy, fertility and economic development by endogenizing the individual
survival probability and by introducing endogenous fertility and education. The probabil-
ity to survive to retirement increases in the governmental resources devoted toward adult
health. Similar to Chapter 2, there exists a positive relationship between life expectancy
and savings. However, due to the feedback effects between life expectancy, savings, fertil-
ity and labor force participation, the overall effects on innovation and economic growth
are ambiguous and cannot be derived analytically. Calibrating the model to U.S. data,
the different channels are quantified. As the central result it is concluded that, according
Chapter 5. General Conclusions 116
to the model, life expectancy effects are positive and contributed with 11.9% to increases
in the U.S. real GDP p.c. over the time period 1960–2017. Also, the growth-maximizing
size of the health care sector might be larger than what is observed in industrialized coun-
tries, nowadays. Combined with the finding from Chapter 2 that the lifetime-maximizing
size of the health care sector is way larger than the size that maximizes income, Chapter
3 supports the view to not only consider the growth effects of health care.
Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes how the Scientific Revolution contributed to the takeoff
toward sustained economic growth. Basic scientific knowledge is an essential input in
applied R&D and increases in the number of tinkerers and in their level of education. For
low levels of development, fertility is high and educational investments are zero. Education
only starts to rise once income surpasses a certain threshold, which spurs innovation,
initiates the fertility transition and paves the way to sustained economic growth. The
rate at which basic scientific knowledge accumulates as well as its availability in applied
research is shown to be crucial in determining the timing and the magnitude of the
economic takeoff. The reason for the given relationship is that scientific knowledge raises
the productivity and the profitability of applied research. These findings provide one
possible explanation why some regions experienced the Industrial Revolution and the
economic takeoff later than others.
In a nutshell, this dissertation identifies several channels through which demographic
change exerts positive growth effects and can at least partly mitigate the negative con-
sequences of population aging. Potential policy measures include higher subsidization of
both applied and basic research, higher health spending, better education and improved
incentives to save and invest in firms and projects that drive the technological frontier
forward.
